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Show 16 and warrantless searches; protection against double jeopardy; protection under the takings clause; the privilege against self-incrimination; the right to due process; and the right to jury by trial in both criminal and civil cases (Mayer, 1990). Darrell Miller (2011) of the NYU Law Review believes that other constitutional rights, such as the right to bear arms, will inevitably become integrated into what Carl Mayer (1990) has called, the "Corporate Bill of Rights" (para. 6). Corporations may not have bodies, souls, or the innate capacity to reason, but they are nonetheless protected as constitutional subjects that use their rights as political agents of social change. Communication critics are still faced with a compelling problematic: while the Supreme Court cannot escape its own modernism as a collection of sovereign, rational, decision makers, and advocacy groups such as Move to Amend have argued that a healthy democratic state relies on clear and decisive acts that discriminate, segregate, and prejudice corporations as subhuman, or at least nonhuman, species, nobody has questioned the assumption that subjectivity is a matter of being a singular human actor when this actor is indeed multiple and nonreasonable. Thus, the question this researcher chooses to engage is this: If subjects are not necessarily human, then what is subjectivity and what can corporations teach us about rhetoric, argumentation, and politics? We have now entered the heart of the matter and must begin to engage poststructural inquiries about subjects, objects, and networks to better understand the limits of humanism and the possibilities of a new orientation for understanding subjectivity in our current communicative moment. As such, the following section discusses a few poststructural perspectives on subjectivity and briefs readers on how Michel Foucault approached the question, "what is the subject." The next section |
