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Show Anonymous Praise for Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 648 presumptions run riot without critical examination. The author is right that decision theory both reflects and is central to the hegemony of neo-Humean views in moral philosophy, and that a critique of decision theory is thus a crucial part of her project. I find that the author makes judicious criticisms of contemporary decision theories and that these criticisms contribute significantly both to explaining and to justifying her Kantian alternative to neo-Humean decision theories. I also find the author's discussion of these issues deft and concise … [T]he author's project is bold, ambitious and very timely. A great virtue of the project is to link its topic directly with issues about our own philosophical ideals and practices. The links are genuine, though the discussion of these issues about the norms governing rational discourse, especially within philosophy, has been rather scarce, especially among philosophers. … The book promises to be a block-buster … The two contrasting accounts of Moore, by Hampshire and by Keynes, are important and illuminating. … The author's discussion of various dialogical pathologies in the field only touches the tip of a very important iceberg. … the author is clearly in command of her issues, topics, and order of discussion. The discussion is all carefully and clearly formulated … The author rightly interprets Kant's moral writings within the context of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and is right that failure to do this has had wide-spread debilitating effects on ‘Kantian' moral theory among analytic philosophers. … The author's objection to Brandom's inferentialist program is sound … Brandom's inferentialism is fatally flawed for just the reason the author points out. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
