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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 223 to consequentialism or deontologism. A perfectionist defines the moral community in much the same way as the deontologist supposedly does; deontologists often extend the scope of their moral concern just as broadly as the consequentialist (as, for example, in Nozick's theory of animal rights). With the possible exception of those ethicists who hold and act on just that false belief which I am attacking, i.e. that adopting some substantive normative value or priority implies a consequentialist or deontological commitment, there is no evidence to support any correlation between these. Now the deontologist ascribes moral arrogance and manipulativeness to the consequentialist because of the latter's assumption of moral responsibility for events over which, it seems, only an omnipotent being could have control; and also because of his concern with effecting the welfare of other people, independently of their prima facie wishes or collaboration. In Chapter XII I develop in depth this criticism of Classical Utilitarianism specifically. But the deontologist's own aspiration to perfect adherence to the moral law, and apparent disregard for inherent human imperfection and irrationality, may just as easily provide fuel for the accusation of moral arrogance, as may the conviction that the preferred set of moral principles are innately superior to any that are either incompatible with them, not a product of Western culture, or both.36 Deontological manipulativeness may be similarly demonstrated in the insistence on systematic moral education in case one is not inclined to adopt the favored principles. Here the reasoning may be that one merely needs to, for example, develop one's capacity for moral intuition, achieve a higher level of rational or moral development, or be taught to respect the moral law, in order to estimate these principles at their proper worth. On the other hand, the consequentialist criticized as selfish and irresponsible the deontologist's concern with personal moral virtue at the expense of general human welfare. But the consequentialist's own selfishness might be just as easily evinced by his insensitivity to the very real desire of other people to determine freely and without outside interference the course of their own lives, and to pursue their own conceptions of the good. Similarly, the consequentialist might demonstrate moral irresponsibility in his willingness to discount or sacrifice the claim of an innocent life if doing so will further social welfare. The general point is clear. Moral arrogance, manipulativeness, selfishness, irresponsibility, and indeed a host of other vices one might have occasion to ascribe to particular ethicists are not the exclusive preserve of any one type of normative theory, any more than is the moral humility, respect for others, altruism, or sense of responsibility by which the accusers would - and could - presumably characterize their own normative views. These qualities Some evidence of this conviction can be gleaned from passages in Kant, Ross, Kohlberg, and Rawls. 36 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
