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Show Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe's Thesis 206 exhibit nothing but its nature and are simply the action itself; therefore the action can neither disavow nor ignore them. On the other hand, however, among the consequences there is also comprised something interposed from without and introduced by chance, and this is quite unrelated to the nature of the action itself.25 Anscombeans who actually study the historical record of de facto normative theories that moral and political philosophers have worked to elaborate might be persuaded of the inadequacy of the consequentialist/ deontological distinction to shed light on the practical prescriptions of any such theory. 3. Value Theory Re-examined Next let us consider more closely the value-theoretic parts of normative theories. Here Anscombe's thesis raises two questions. First, is there any intrinsic difference in content that distinguishes consequentialist from deontological theories? And second, is there any intrinsic difference in their structures? An Anscombean of course would answer both questions affirmatively. I propose to answer both negatively. In this section I turn to the first question, leaving the second for Section 3.3, below. 3.1. Interchangeability It may seem evident that there is a radical difference in the kind of content appropriate to consequentialist and deontological theories respectively. Here the basic issue on which the distinction turns is whether a moral theory is constructed so as to ascribe primary value to some end the realization of which serves as the criterion for evaluating the moral worth of actions or institutions that promote it; or whether it ascribes primary value to these actions or institutions themselves, independently of their outcomes. In the first case the end in question is commonly described as "good," and that which promotes it as "right." In the second case, the actions or institutions are held to be right on other grounds, and not just as means to some further end. But once again we will see that this distinction is not sufficient to distinguish between two normative value theories described as consequentialist and deontological respectively, for anything that can count as good in this sense can also be right, and anything that is right in this sense can also be good. So whether the right or the good is to have priority is of no importance for the substance of one's favored normative theory. What confers moral value on whatever in the theory has worth or value? The consequentialist may claim that the end confers value on the actions and institutions that promote it, but that nothing further confers value on the end itself; it simply has intrinsic worth. We can describe this latter type of value as G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York, N.Y.: 1975), paragraph 118, note. 25 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
