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Show Chapter XIV. Hume's Metaethics 594 That Hume maintains (P.1) follows from the variety of objects he subjects to his principles of variability, of which we have already spoken. (P.2) follows from his many and detailed discussions of the disturbing and distinctive effects of the object's spatiotemporal and psychological proximity to the individual, which we have also already reviewed (e.g. T 489, E 234). (C) follows from the premises plus the implicit assumption that the objective perspective is to distance as the subjective perspective is to proximity. We find support for this assumption in Hume's own repeated use of the phrase "distant view" to characterize this perspective (e.g. T 583, E 196/239). We can then further describe the objective perspective as one that involves psychological and emotional distance from just those objects that are psychologically and spatiotemporally - therefore emotionally - closest to us: considerations of self-interest, immediate sources of pleasure, proximate objects of gratification, etc. To distance ourselves from these objects is precisely to view them as though from that psychological or spatiotemporal distance at which they would not affect the passions as violently and distort our judgment as completely as they otherwise do. This interpretation is further confirmed by the following important passage from the Enquiry, which I quote in full: (B) All men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few are successful in the pursuit; one considerable cause is the want of strength of mind, which might enable them to resist the temptation of present ease or pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another: and these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer to us, or acquire the advantage of favorable lights and positions, which catch the heart and imagination; our general resolutions are frequently confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune; it is obvious that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery (E 196/239). In passage (B) Hume makes a number of important points. First, he amplifies further his conception of the objective perspective. For here we see that this perspective requires us not merely to distance ourselves emotionally from our © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
