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Show Chapter III. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality: Informal Interpretations 108 or inefficiently, by making a few perfunctory and tactless remarks about their record-keeping practices. Again assume Reginald chooses the former, instrumentally efficient strategy. Arguing eloquently is a further instrumental object-end he can achieve efficiently, by marshalling and rehearsing his arguments in advance; or inefficiently, by relying on his native wit and ability to be fast on his feet. Now suppose that here Reginald chooses the latter alternative. He realizes, of course, that he could argue his case for more paperwork before his superiors with far greater eloquence if he marshalled and rehearsed his arguments beforehand; and that he is likely to forget some of them, as well as deliver those he remembers with less polish, if he relies on his native wit. Nevertheless, rehearsing beforehand is just too boring. And since Reginald opts for excitement over efficiency when these two particular meta-ends conflict, he chooses to rely on his native wit. Now having made this choice, there may well be further choices of instrumental strategy to be made: whether to speak quickly or slowly, whether to use a Latinate or an AngloSaxon vocabulary, whether to wear a sports jacket or a three-piece suit, and so forth. In all such cases, Reginald may choose among these instrumental objectends on grounds of efficiency, or on other grounds - of excitement, tastefulness, honesty, etc. At no point does rationality require him to opt for efficiency over these other meta-ends, if they are more important to him, even if he thereby endangers his chances of efficiently sabotaging the bureaucracy's objectends. For although this is one of Reginald's long-term meta-ends, it may be perfectly rational for him to be unwilling to subordinate his personal style for its sake. Now the efficiency expert may retort that Reginald thereby maximizes the instrumental meta-end of avoiding boredom and preserving his personal style by relying on his native wit; that he achieves this instrumental meta-end itself efficiently, by means of such reliance. But how does he maximize the instrumental object-end of relying on his native wit? By what means does he efficiently achieve it? The efficiency expert must reply that he maximizes the instrumental object-end of relying on his native wit simply by relying on it, or by performing any set of actions which relying on his native wit comprises. This is the "means" by which Reginald "efficiently achieves" this instrumental end. The efficiency expert's conception of achieving an end E by performing an instrumental action A thus conflates two cases: one in which E is a physically discrete causal consequence of A, in which case E can be achieved efficiently or inefficiently by means of A; and one in which E is merely an intentional redescription of A. In this second case, one "efficiently achieves" E by ascribing E to A as the object of its intention. All actions, in this sense, are "efficient means" to the ends they conceptually instantiate. So either efficiency © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
