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Show Chapter IX. The Problem of Moral Justification 366 lifestyles were socially isolating, for example, might count as a reason against them for members of any of the three communities, but as a consideration in their favor for him; that certain activities would bring one face-to-face with one's own mortality might count as a reason against them for others but as a reason for them for him; that certain kinds of relationships would fill his life with connection to others might count as a reason against them for him but a reason for them for others; and so forth. Similarly, it is not implausible that, given his experiences, he might not agree with members of any of the three social communities on how to introduce into the dialogue new considerations for or against things as reasons (norms (E) and (G)). By hypothesis he would be fully conversant with the practices members of all three cultures agreed on for doing this - something analogous, let us suppose, to following Robert's Rules of Order. But he might justifiably think these practices inadequate for introducing considerations that were radically unlike those members of these cultures were conditioned to recognize as reasons. He might think that precisely because of their social cohesion and conformity, there were certain sorts of quite important reasons that members of all three communities simply were not psychologically or socially equipped to consider; that they just wouldn't "get it." And he might think that only quite radical presentations of these considerations - in theatrical or otherwise dramatic symbolic form, perhaps, or in acts of self-immolation or antisocial destruction, might lead the light to dawn. Being unwilling or unable to perform such acts himself, he might conclude that there was no way for him to tell the story that made sense of his ideals, that would give it a compelling point or reveal the defects, limitations, or insensitivities in the perspectives of an audience of interlocutors whose experiences were so radically different from and limited relative to his own. Although he might fully understand their valuations, he might realistically conclude that there was no way for him to make his valuations intelligible to them. For all of these reasons, his valuations would not be rationally endorsable by other participants in the rational dialogue Anderson describes, nor might he think it worth his while even to participate in it (norm (F)). But this would not imply that he was unable to make sense of his own values. First, it would not imply this for the interpretive locution. He would be able to explain his attitudes and values in the same terms I have just described, offering reasons why he values and disvalues as he does that enable us to understand his valuations even if we did not share them. Second, that his values were not rationally endorsable from Anderson's hypothetical common point of view would not imply that it would not make sense prescriptively for him to respond and act as he does. He could, by hypothesis, give realistic and wellgrounded reasons for valuing solitude, silence, and confrontation with mortality, such that we would be compelled to recognize the rational integrity © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
