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Show Chapter VII. Nagel's Internalism 280 the form, "I desire that P," where "P" is the description of my performing the action in question; and that this mental event has motivational force only if the practical judgments that cause it to form do. So a motivated desire is among the causal antecedents of action only if (1) it is a mental event; and either (2) it is preceded by a motivationally effective practical judgment or (3) it is preceded by unmotivated desires. We have already seen that unmotivated desires (2.3.(3)) are unnecessary as causal antecedents of action. Let us then consider 2.3.(2). Nagel claims that practical judgments that one has reason to do something always have motivational efficacy, so motivated desires that are mental events preceded by such judgments always do as well. If practical judgments that one has reason to act always have motivational content, then they have it whether or not that judgment itself is well founded. So it is the occurrence of the judgment rather than the recognition of its rational content as rational that motivationally influences action. It is then possible that the occurrent cognitive mental events that precede a motivated desire might consist in mental ruminations, associations, and imaginings that cause the desire but do not justify it; and that on the one hand do not just assail us, but on the other provide no reasons for the actions we take in response to them, either. So as yet we cannot regard that content as a rationally inescapable requirement on action. So far no link has been established between the actual rationality of a judgment and its motivational efficacy. The conjunction of 2.3.(1) and 2.3.(2) leaves open the possibility that an irrational or nonrational judgment might cause an equally irrational or nonrational motivated desire, which in turn might issue an irrational or nonrational action. Judgments of this kind cannot provide criteria for the rational evaluation of desire, nor, therefore, for rational altruism in action. Finally, consider 2.3.(1). A motivated desire may, according to 2.3.(1) alone, be a mental event that is in itself causally impotent. But it is also possible that it may be causally effective because preceded only by causally effective occurrent cognitive events such as believings, considerings, or deliberatings. So even if motivated desires are more than mere conceptual truths, Nagel's view implies that practical judgments, and the occurrent cognitive events they involve, may be the sole motivationally effective psychological antecedents of action in some cases. Nagel has intimated something of this kind all along. For example, he earlier defined altruistic action as "any behavior motivated merely by the belief that someone else will benefit or avoid harm by it" (16, n. 1; italics added). He also characterized his own position as "one which ties the motivation to the cognitive content of ethical claims, [and] requires the postulation of © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
