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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 517 friendship. But will it? If my friend knows I decide what to do on grounds of utility alone, she will justifiably infer that my openness with her is similarly a matter of policy - that I would not do it if it did not maximize social utility. But my concern with what maximizes social utility clearly transcends the particulars of our relationship; it is this larger goal that I consistently keep in mind and in terms of which the quality of our relationship finds warrant. And if she knows this, she knows my honesty is not merely for the sake of our friendship - not, that is, merely for the sake of my respect and affection for her, but for something in comparison with which the independent value of our friendship pales in significance. Concurring with Sidgwick, I as a Utilitarian "perceive friendship to be an important means to the Utilitarian end."34 My friend's knowing that I view her in this light hardly seems auspicious for our friendship. I might, nevertheless, sincerely advise my friend to perform the most socially beneficial, utility-maximizing actions, show her my own consistency in this regard, and demonstrate the good effects that can be brought about. But this will result only if I can somehow convince her that what I tell her to do, and demonstrate by example should be done, is in fact what I want her to do. For while she has no cause to doubt that I see some course of action for her as best, she has no assurance that I think that the best way of getting her to do it is by sincerely advising her to do so. Since she knows that my primary concern is to maximize utility and not to give her my honest opinion, she knows that I might think it best to advise her to do x in order to bring it about that she does y (where y is incompatible with, a side effect of, or part of x). In fact, my friend's suspicion on this point may be justifiably extended to all facets of our interaction: can she ever be sure that my responses to her are not intended to get her to do or think what I think it best for her to do or think, independently of whether she agrees with my judgments? It seems that there is no way of insuring that even the most minimal conditions of moral dialogue are met. As Strawson points out,35 I may seem to engage her in moral discourse without really doing so. Notice that this is an interpersonal analogue of the instrumentalization dilemma, consequent upon the Humean model of motivation, described in Chapter II.3.2. In "Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community," 36 Lawrence Stern argues that Strawson fails to distinguish between calculation and manipulation in his conception of the "objective" attitude. He defines calculation as "subjecting Sidgwick, op. cit. Note 1, p. 437. P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen & Co., 1974). Strawson's distinction between the objective and the involved attitudes bring out nicely the difference between the perspective a consistent utilitarian must assume and that of most other people. 36 Lawrence Stern, "Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community," Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 72-84. 34 35 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
