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Show Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation 240 psychologically, and does not enter into my psychological state, how does it manage to propel me into action? But if it does not manage to propel me into action, what is the point of talking about it? On the other hand, if, as one might hope, my motivation does after all affect me psychologically, then in what respect is motivational strength inherently different from psychological strength? Why distinguish between them at all? Why not just say that we often have many different desires, of different psychological strengths, some of which are greater and some less, such that the strongest is motivationally overriding and such that principle-dependent desires can occupy that role? For unless there is some more comprehensive internal principle that weighs and evaluates psychological and motivational strength relative to each other, we are then susceptible to making some rather peculiar decisions as to what to do. Thus suppose I have a principle-dependent, rational desire to maximize utility and I determine, after careful reflection, that this requires maximizing my personal wealth (thus this is not an object-dependent desire for wealth itself). Suppose that on this basis, I ascribe higher priority to being a rich dentist than to being a poet (thus being a rich dentist is similarly not an objectdependent desire in my scheme of things, but rather embedded in my principle-dependent desire to maximize utility). My desire to become a rich, utility-maximizing dentist satisfies Rawls' fourfold definition of a principledependent desire, in that (1') it is dependent on the utility-maximization principle for an accurate description of the end I desire to realize by becoming a rich, utility-maximizing dentist; (2') the "force, or weight" of my desire in my moral psychology is a function not of its psychological strength, but rather of the utilitymaximization principle needed to properly describe it; (3') the evaluative priority of my desire to become a rich, utilitymaximizing dentist is similarly given entirely by the utility-maximization principle to which that desire is attached, rather than by its psychological strength; and (4') the desire is of a kind that only a rational agent who can understand and apply the utility-maximization principle can have. Suppose that I then devote myself to the vocational end of becoming a rich, utility-maximizing dentist, even though being a poet has greater psychological strength for me, and even though I have no object-dependent desire to be a rich, utility-maximizing dentist. That my principle-dependent desire to be a rich, utility-maximizing dentist should override my objectdependent desire to be a poet seems counterintuitive at best, psychologically unhealthy at worst. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
