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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 587 for that end. This is the only basis on which Hume permits the object in question to count as an end for us at all (T 414); and desire and aversion themselves are direct passions. Many states of affairs may cause us to desire something. Among those not identical with the object of the desire are envy, malice, generosity, etc. But in addition to these causes, we must also count as necessary, if not sufficient, the thought of the object itself, considered as a source of pleasure or pain. We cannot experience that passion Hume calls "desire" without simultaneously experiencing the thought of that object our desire is a desire for. So the object of desire, or end, is a necessary concomitant of at least two of the passions: desire and aversion. Moreover, desire or aversion must be necessary concomitants of all the other passions, for Hume, in so far as these motivate the agent to seek an object of pleasure or avoid an object of pain (T 414, 417). We could not blindly take on the new project, merely out of joy in our past achievements. For this alone would not be sufficient to determine our choice of that one end over many others. Out of joy in our past achievements alone we might as easily choose to rest on our laurels as to press on to something new. Although this joy might well override any fondness or enthusiasm we might feel for the end in its own right, there must be at least enough interest to determine our choice of that end rather than some other; and Hume supplies no alternative to desire, for example an account of intention as causally efficacious, that would satisfy this desideratum.21 Hence for Hume the very fact that we adopt some particular end indicates the presence of a desire for that end. Conversely, the presence of desire is sufficient to indicate an end or purpose, since desire is one of those passions that must take an intentional object. Hence the presence of desire can be tautologically construed as a necessary ingredient in any combination of passions that can motivate us to action, just as the contemporary belief-desire model of motivation would require. So if the passions are the sole sources of behavioral motivation, and if the passions cannot be contrary to reason, then the ends they lead us to adopt cannot be irrational either. The absence of rational constraints on desire is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the absence of rational constraints on ends. Thus we must conclude that Hume not only accepts the traditional view of reason, but actively embraces both the positive and the negative utility-maximization theses - for more reasons even than he himself explicitly gives. 21 As, for example, Kant arguably does. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
