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Show Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation 236 plausible explanation of why we ever act to promote another's interests does not thereby confine that explanation to a single, monolithic motive. The interest a self takes in the satisfaction of its other-directed desires is a genuine interest in the self, and so is distinct from what John Rawls calls interests of a self.2 These are discussed at greater length in Chapter X. But briefly, interests of a self include other-directed interests and beliefs that do not necessarily involve desires at all. Particular moral or religious or political convictions might be among the other-directed interests of a self that bear no necessary relation to the self's interest in satisfying its other-directed desires. So, for example, a belief in the welfare state, or in retributive justice might be among the interests of one's self, yet bear no necessary connection to one's interest in satisfying one's other-directed desire that one's friends prosper. However, interests of the self that are also interests in the self need not be interests in satisfying the self's desires. They can also be interests in adhering to the self's abstract convictions. Even though such beliefs are not specifically self-directed in content, they can be of interest to the self because they are its own. In such a case the self takes an interest in them because it authors and owns them. Since authorship and ownership of a belief is a condition of the self, the self is taking an interest in its own condition even when the content of the conviction is not specifically self-directed. Therefore one can have a selfinterested motive in adhering to abstract or other-directed conviction. For example, Michael Walzer distinguishes between a would-be leader of the oppressed whose actions are justified by his ideology, and one whose actions are justified by the acceptance of her ideology by the oppressed as a set of terms in which their interests are adequately expressed.3 The first, he points out, is obligated only to himself and those who share his commitment, whereas the second is obligated to the oppressed group from whom she seeks ideological legitimacy. Both leaders are motivated by interests of a self and neither is motivated by desire. But the first leader takes an interest in the condition of his self, namely that its ideology furnish the justification of his actions. The second, by contrast, takes a greater interest in the condition of other selves, namely that the oppressed accept her ideology as adequately expressing their interests. The first is inspired to lead by his interest in his ideology; the second by her interest in the legitimacy of her ideology among those she leads. The first is motivated to action by an interest that is of and in the self, whereas the second is motivated by an interest of the self that is other-directed. Walzer's distinction shows that there is nothing inherently sacred either about interests of a self that are not desires, or about beliefs that John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 127. 3 Michael Walzer, "The Obligations of Oppressed Minorities," in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 55. 2 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
