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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 375 anything other than what we already do in virtue of acting? If the PGC is logically implied by the concept of action, then it follows tautologically from that concept. Then I necessarily follow it, just in virtue of acting. If the PGC requires me to do more than what I already do just by acting, then it contains more than the concept of action from which it is derived. In this case it seems that some extra assumptions must be appended as the argument progresses. Now Nagel appended to his account of our impersonal self-conception as one among many equally real individuals an analysis of reasons as timelessly, tenselessly, and objectively valid, in order to generate the requirement of altruism. This was unobjectionable because he did not claim to give a strictly logical derivation in the first place. By having chosen boldly to meet the Kantian challenge head-on, Gewirth does not have that luxury. If he really means to derive the PGC from the concept of action, then whatever is strictly implied by the concept of action itself should suffice to enjoin our obedience to it. To see this, consider the consequences of my realizing that my being a teacher follows tautologically from my being a professor. There would be no such consequences. I would not behave any differently upon realizing that, in virtue of being a professor, I am also thereby a teacher. Then analogously, why should my learning that, in virtue of acting, I am committed to the PGC move me to do anything more than what I already do in virtue of acting? If my concept of action itself does not elicit from me obedience to the PGC, why should my discovery that that it implies the PGC do so? Gewirth might respond by likening his conceptual analysis to a complex mathematical proof, in which the tautological relationship between axioms and results are not obvious, but rather must be exhibited through elaborate reasoning in an extended sequence of steps. Relative to this sequence, the conclusion is a surprise that affords us genuinely new information, even though it was implicit in the old. The question then would be how close the similarities between Gewirth's derivation and a mathematical one actually are. In a mathematical proof, a later step in the sequence is derived from an earlier one through the application of canonical rules of logic and theorems already proven. The challenge for Gewirth will be to not import into his analysis any additional unargued or controversial assumptions in order to derive the conclusion he wants. If he meets this challenge, then those of us with a deeply rooted commitment to accurate theoretical reasoning might be convinced to accept his derivation of the PCG from the concept of action. If he does not, then our acceptance or rejection of the PGC will turn on other, nonrational factors, such as its intuitive viability, familiarity, convenience, or appeal. Thus it is important to emphasize that the failure of the metaethical project of providing a foundational rational justification of a normative moral theory does not entail the failure, falsehood, or unacceptability of the theory itself, for Gewirth any © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
