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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 165 meta-ends like being honest, being entertaining, and being tactful, respectively; and that Amos gives these three a cyclical ordering as described by (C). To suppose that Amos has merely changed his mind at t3 is to suggest that he can vacillate with ease among the values of honesty, entertainment, and tact, just as he might among apples, oranges, and pears; i.e. that adopting and discarding these behavior attitudes, and all that each implies for the more specific choices of behavior he must make from moment to moment, is no more problematic than adopting and discarding a jacket when the weather changes. An agent capable of effortlessly altering his primary characterological priorities from one moment to the next, or whenever new alternatives and circumstances present themselves, either purchases transitivity at the price of psychological consistency, or at least gives new meaning to the concept of spineless compromise. But this is to conceive only the more realistic case. Clyde, who reorders literally all of his priorities from one choice occasion to the next, presents the more radical challenge to the principle of charity. By hypothesis, Clyde is able to sustain an enduring sense of psychological continuity at the same time that all his preferences undergo revision from moment to moment. But in the absence of at least some enduring priorities, it is not easy to see in what this sense of psychological continuity could consist. Under these circumstances, Clyde would be little more than an enduring physical entity, constantly bombarded by new possibilities, constantly changing his mind about what to do and what is important, with no psychological consistency from one moment to the next. We can assume, for the sake of argument, that he has memories of previous ranking occasions. Indeed he must, in order to be capable of remembering, from moment to moment, what the enterprise of ranking alternatives requires him to do. But by hypothesis, he is unmotivated to recall these previous orderings as in any way important or interesting, for there are no ongoing goals, values, or plans of action of overriding importance relative to which they can be assessed and ranked. But the problem is even worse than this. So far I have described Clyde's dilemma as one concerning choice among alternatives that can be consistently ordered. However, Clyde himself is incapable even of picking among alternatives all of which are acceptable. I quote at length Edward McClennen's description of Clyde's dilemma: How is he to pick? Suppose that he decides to settle it by the flip of a coin: if heads, he will pick x, and if tails, he will pick y. Let him now perform the experiment and observe its outcome. Whatever the outcome [heads or tails], why now should that outcome settle anything as to which one to pick? The decision to settle the matter by the toss of a coin is history. … Moreover, it is still the case that from a [utility-maximizing] perspective he has no basis for deciding which one to pick. Perhaps he should flip the coin again! Alternatively, suppose that [Clyde] simply © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
