| OCR Text |
Show Acknowledgements to Volume I xxii 1988, and a Woodrow Wilson International Scholars' Fellowship in 1988-1989. At Georgetown I profited from discussions with Wayne Davis, Terry Pinkard and Henry Richardson. I also spent many, very fruitful hours discussing this material with colleagues at the University of Michigan, all Humeans to a man. To them I am most grateful of all for pulling no punches in their attempts to dissuade me from my views, from these chapters, and not least of all from this project. Had they not put those views to the test by resorting to every possible tactic of dissuasion, I would have had no proof that my views could withstand them. To have that proof - to know that my philosophical position was able to survive the gauntlets devised by some of the very best minds in the field - is the invaluable gift that I owe to them. I should particularly like to thank Allan Gibbard and David Velleman for conversation. Many other individuals have helped me in the writing of these two chapters, including Glenn Loury, Michael Slote, Robert Audi, David Levy, and especially Ned McClennen for extensive comments on earlier drafts. I was honored by the opportunity to present both to a group of trained economists at the Economics and Rhetoric Seminar, held at the Academia Vitae in Deventer, The Netherlands, in June 2006. I am particularly grateful to Arjo Klamer, Dierdre McCloskey and P. W. Zuidhof for beneficial discussion that has improved their final form. I was helped by discussion of the first draft of Chapter V at a University of Michigan Faculty Seminar, and particularly by comments from Richard Brandt, Arthur Burks, Allan Gibbard, Louis Loeb, Peter Railton, Nicholas White, and Stephen White. An earlier version was published under the title, "A Distinction Without a Difference," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VII: Social and Political Philosophy (1982), 403-435. Chapter VI was completed and delivered to the Scholars' Seminar at the Getty Research Institute in November 1998, and to the Philosophy Department at the University of Minnesota in October 1999. I am grateful to both audiences for constructive comments and suggestions for improvement. Chapter VII is the outcome of over two decades of intense and satisfying - and, aside from Paul Coppock's insightful comments, largely solitary - labor on Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism. This part of the project taught me much more about patience and persistence than I ever could have expected when, after completing the chapter to my satisfaction a first time, I then allowed it to be irretrievably misplaced and had to reconstitute it from scratch (a scholar's worst nightmare in the pre-computer era). I am deeply grateful to the Woodrow Wilson International Research Center of the Smithsonian Institution for extending my International Scholars' Fellowship for a second year, 1989-90, so that I could do this. Earlier versions of parts of Chapter VIII were published under the following titles: "Two Conceptions of the Self," Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September l985), 173-197, reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual VIII (1985), 222-246; "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," The Journal of Philosophy © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
