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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 523 Section 1 describes and evaluates Baier's distinctive Anti-Rationalist methodology in philosophical argument, what I call the indexical approach; and compares it with that of Hume himself. Section 2 examines Baier's attempt to replace Social Contract Theory with an analysis of familial and power relations among mutually dependent and morally unequal and imperfect human agents. Section 3 traces Baier's Humean critique of Kant's model of Social Contract Theory and attempt to install Hume as a better role model for contemporary moral philosophy. Section 4 evaluates Baier's arguments, and concludes that, just as Hume's own theses often presupposed the foundational assumptions that Kant made explicit, Baier's case for Humean moral philosophy presupposes the Kantian assumptions it is supposed to replace. Section 5 reconstructs Baier's Humean analysis of trust as the foundation of her normative moral theory. Section 6 evaluates it with respect to several criteria a bona fide moral theory must satisfy, and concludes that Baier's moral theory satisfies them - without, however, dispensing with the background, Social Contract-Theoretic moral assumptions she attacks. Section 7 evaluates Baier's indexical approach to philosophical exposition, and suggests that the radical and unwarranted extent to which she deploys it marks the point of departure between her own philosophical priorities on the one side, and those of Hume, Kant, and Socrates on the other. 1. Baier's Humeanism Baier states her allegiance to Hume's own ethics and epistemology up front. The care and sensitivity with which she treats Hume's texts confirm this. Baier calls our attention to very many of Hume's little known or previously disregarded arguments and pronouncements - for example, his account of familial relationships (MP 69), of single motherhood (MP 73), and his thesis that knowledge acquisition depends on the structure of governmental authority (MP 90). She situates these accounts in the contexts in which their significance becomes clear; and she draws forth their implication and applications to contemporary issues of concern. Moreover, Baier's insistence on situating Hume's moral philosophy in the context of his 2 epistemology and psychology, even though it would ease her own task to treat it in isolation, is exemplary and unusual. She tolerates undogmatically Hume's philosophical flaws, and is willing not only to defend his insights and contributions, but to take him to task, in print, however reluctantly, for inconsistencies, howlers, or morally, politically or intellectually indefensible claims - his condescension toward women, for example (MP 52); or his racism (MP 291). That is, Baier treats Hume not as an authority to be propped up at 2 Baier develops this argument at length in her Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). Page references to this work are parenthecized in the text preceded by "PS." © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
