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Show Anonymous Praise for Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume II: A Kantian Conception 647 Humeans will complain that she shifts the burden of proof to them to say why the intellect or reason cannot cause action, but that seems fair enough after two hundred years of the burden being given to the Kantians to show that it can. … Can reason ground morality? [Piper] makes an interesting move on this question and one that is deeply Kantian. She starts with Kant's moral theory … as providing a description of a perfectly rational/moral agent. This is certainly the way Kant saw things. Others have noticed this in the past, but I think that [Piper] uses this recognition to much better effect. Once this ideal is in place, ordinary human behavior that falls long short of perfectly morality is explained in terms of stratagems for preserving the appearance of rational consistency (and so the life of the agent as such) in the face of recalcitrant data. There is an elegance here, as well as a strong Kantian strain, where reason is the hero of ethics and rationalization (or the misuse of reason) is the villain. Varieties of rationalizing are presented in chapters 7 and 8. I think the discussion of self-deception is interesting and plausible. … The ms. is very long, 763 pp. + a 54 pp. bibliography by my count. Still, it is not a cumbersome read; the prose marches along in quite a compelling way. This is an important and ambitious project, right-headed in many important regards. … The author is clearly correct about several important points, central to the present study, including the following: Contemporary philosophical thought in matters moral remains deeply and pervasively influenced by often unacknowledged Humean assumptions that frame and guide philosophical accounts of moral matters. These Humean assumptions are far less plausible and justifiable than their adherent recognize. Rather than examining or justifying these Humean assumptions, they are more often enforced as a matter of professional orthodoxy. These Humean assumptions are subject to Kant's incisive criticisms of Hume. Kant's criticisms of Hume have not yet been adequately analysed, nor (accordingly) given their proper due among contemporary moral philosophers, including even the work of some self-proclaimed Kantian moral theorists, such as the late John Rawls. Kant's criticisms of Hume pertaining to moral philosophy require and deserve the extended and detailed treatment the author gives them. Contemporary moral philosophers are committed, in theory and in practice, to high standards of rational justification, although these standards and both their theory and their practice cannot be accounted for on the basis of the basically Humean views advocated by a broad swath of contemporary, especially analytic moral philosophers.… [D]ecision theory has allowed philosophers to let their neo-Humean © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
