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Show Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider 502 doing so. But clearly this does not preclude the case - without begging the question - in which, in the estimation of the Utilitarian, the overall utility of controverting the rule is in fact greater than that of following it. Here the Instrumentalist calculations are exactly the same for the ActUtilitarian as for Hobbes' free rider; only the source of utility differs. Hobbes' free rider derives it from the pursuit of self-directed benefit, whereas Sidgwick's Act-Utilitarian derives it from the pursuit of other-directed benefit. In this latter case, it would clearly seem to conflict with Utilitarian first principles to follow the rule.11 So if everyone follows these rules, this is because all perceive it as instrumentally useful to do so. But because the justification by utility is itself accessible to all members of this community, the very recognition of an agent's situation as being exceptional will determine that an exception should be made, for so would any Utilitarian reason who had access to the facts - including the agent herself. Thus although the problem of the free rider can arise on the assumption of other-directed as well as self-directed ends so long as the rules are conceived as mere instrumental means to the achievement of those ends, Sidgwick's conception of the ideal Act-Utilitarian society is one in which clandestine free riding is impossible because all agents have the same otherdirected end, namely the maximization of social utility. The Utilitarian motive behind any action that violates the rules can be read off from the behavior itself - and thus identify grounds for qualifying the rules in order to include it. In the ideal Utilitarian community, all citizens would reason similarly and conclude, on Act-Utilitarian grounds, that such violations were justified by Utilitarian considerations. Hence the social instability that widespread clandestine free-riding would threaten would seem not to occur in the ideal Act-Utilitarian community, because rules would be broken only when all citizens could recognize this as maximizing social utility and thus warranting a revision of the rules themselves. Whereas Hobbes' commonwealth is one in which publicity uncovers and ostracizes self-directed deviations from the common good, Sidgwick's ideal Utilitarian community is one in which other-directed violations of the rules are publicly condoned by the universality of the Utilitarian motive itself. Here social instability would seem to be impossible under the two conditions that (1) all citizens are motivated by the same other-directed desire to maximize social utility, and For a comprehensive examination of this and related issues, see David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), esp. chap. 4C. Also see D.H. Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 3-7; and Peter Singer, "Is Act-Utilitarianism Self-defeating?" Philosophical Review 61 (1972): 565. 11 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
