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Show Chapter IX. The Problem of Moral Justification 402 promotion of just any ends, including recognizably immoral ends. In this case it may justify the theory, without morally justifying it. It seems, then, that we cannot generate a specifically moral Instrumentalist justification of an action or set of social arrangements without imposing or presupposing at least some prior moral constraints on the range of ends the choosing agent is assumed to desire to promote - as the moral philosophers mentioned above all seem implicitly to recognize. Next I suggest that to the extent that such constraints are imposed, either the action or set of social arrangements in question cannot be justified, or else the Humean model of instrumental rationality is doing no work in justifying them. 4.3. The Incredible Shrinking Means Now consider a second example of an action that is instrumental to certain final ends, namely giving one's money away. Consider what an instrumentally rational justification of this action might look like, keeping in mind that such a justification must attempt to persuade, not just some few agents, but everyone, you included, that it is rational to give one's money away. Giving one's money away seems to have certain obvious disadvantages. It may frustrate one's opportunities to indulge expensive tastes, or to satisfy certain desires for which money is a prerequisite, such as buying one's parents a house or securing a high-quality education for one's children. It also leaves one in a position of relative insecurity, for one cannot know in advance what emergencies the future may bring. Unfortunately there seem to be no obvious compensations for these disadvantages. However, this depends on the kinds of desires one has. If one takes one's expensive tastes very seriously, or are particularly committed to securing the wellbeing of one's family, or to being prepared for future emergencies, then the disadvantages of giving one's money away may seem practically insurmountable. But if one does not happen to care as much about these things as one does about supporting anti-racist initiatives, ending worldwide famine, and fighting cultural imperialism - let us call these beneficent ends - then the disadvantages may be more than adequately outweighed by the range of ends one cares about that giving one's money away enables one to promote. So if one has beneficent final ends, and one agrees that giving one's money away is the best way to promote them, then one has a reason for giving one's money away. If you have such a reason, giving your money away would seem to be instrumentally rational for you. Of course if you do not happen to have beneficent final ends, then you will not be as impressed by the argument that giving one's money away enables one to realize them. Not only will you fail to be persuaded by this argument. You may not even recognize it as an argument. Rather than an argument or attempt at justification, this claim may strike you as little more © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
