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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 469 desires if we act on the basis of full information about them. Moreover, irrational desires interfere with desire-satisfaction generally, as when one has an irrational aversion to going outside but desires a vacation in the Bahamas. Notice that all three of these reasons appeal to self-interest and the personal comfort of the agent. He says, by acting rationally (= avoiding cognitive defects at the moment of decision) we assure that our desires, present and future, are satisfied as fully as possible in the circumstances, irrespective of what they are. By showing that a given action is rational, then, by implication we show that it is chosen by a procedure fitted to maximize satisfaction of desires for the agent. Thus the showing that an action is rational must recommend the act - to any agent, since every agent is an agent with desires. The showing does not accidentally recommend to some people; when we consider that all agents are creatures with desires, it recommends of necessity (154). This is a classic encapsulation of Instrumentalism and of the Humean conception of the self more generally, within which reason is merely a means to the satisfaction of personal desire; and of the Instrumentalist strategy most Humeans adopt. Thus Brandt regards as unproblematic the assumption that self-interested action is always rational. This assumption depends on the prior assumption that self-interested desires are always rational. That is, Brandt assumes that an action's being in our self-interest always provides us with a motivationally effective reason to perform it. We have already found reason to dispute this assumption in Chapter VI, and find more in Volume II, Chapter VIII. Further considerations that Brandt invokes which recommend rational desire include the fact that we do not like it when our desires and actions are inconsistent with our beliefs. We desire rationally coherent desires: The proposal here is that awareness of the fact that one has irrational desires works in a way similar to awareness that one has incoherent beliefs or unjustified fears. One is made uncomfortable by the awareness, and is motivated to remove its source (157). In line with Brandt's assumption that it is rational to seek personal comfort (159), the desire for rationally coherent desires is itself putatively justified by our desire to avoid the discomforting effect of an awareness that our desires are incoherent. This assumption is in general not sound as a criterion of rationality. But even if it were, it would not furnish a satisfying answer to the question as to the rational status of the desire for coherent desires, and why we should prefer coherent to incoherent desires. That answer, too, will have to await more extensive treatment in Volume II, Chapter VIII.1-2. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
