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Show Chapter VII. Nagel's Internalism 264 desires as universal on the one hand, but as idiosyncratic, arbitrary, contingent, and impervious to rational assessment on the other. Because desires, on the belief-desire model, are universal, any account of moral motivation must refer to them. But this implies that any account of moral motivation as rationally inescapable must therefore refer to a type of motivation that is not subject to rational assessment at all. Nagel's dilemma is one with which any Kantian rationalist can sympathize. On the one hand, moral principles need to be universally applicable, objectively valid, and logically or conceptually necessary (or at least "inescapable," to use Nagel's term), if they are to do the necessary work of coordinating the behavior of different individuals and resolving conflicts among their disparate interests. After all, one wants to be able rationally to require of moral agents not only that they behave rightly, but also that they behave reliably. On the other hand, one wants an internalist account of reasons that will explain how these principles can causally effect action. These two desiderata seem prima facie incompatible. Although it is not inconceivable that some set of principles might satisfy the conditions of universality, objectivity, and necessity, our adherence to them need satisfy none of these conditions. Then how can we resolve the universality, objectivity and necessity of moral principle with the sporadic and seemingly nonrational motivation of particular agents to act on it? Simply declaring that moral principle provides one with a reason for action is not enough, if the reason is not one the agent has in mind, or is one that has no compelling force for her even if she does. The externalist agrees that moral principle provides one with a reason for action; he denies merely that this reason in fact must motivate the agent to act. Even stipulating the agent's cognizings of the principle seems insufficient: the externalist can either deny that cognizings are motivationally effective mental events; or, even if they are, that they are any less arbitrary, contingent, transient, or idiosyncratic than desires. If cognizings and desires are similar in this regard, then in their absence, it is hard to see how we can be obligated to act on a principle of which we are, at least for that moment or circumstance, unaware, or by which we are uninspired, no matter how universal and necessary it is. Kant's solution to the dilemma was to show consistent adherence to universal, objective and necessary moral principle to be a necessary condition of transpersonal rationality. He argued that agents who fail the requirement of consistent adherence could be shown to be defective in reason as well: [I]f reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will is still subordinated to subjective conditions (certain drives) which do not always agree with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not in itself completely in accord with reason (as is really the case for human beings); then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
