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Show Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends 328 Categorical desires are ordinarily formed within and by "the dispositions which constitute a commitment to morality." [PC, 12] Nevertheless, the possibility of a radical conflict with morality exists. A categorical desire that (1) is closely related to an agent's existence; (2) gives meaning to and a reason for his life in the sense just described; (3) thus provides the motive force that propels him into the future; and (4) may radically conflict with morality is what Williams calls a ground project. [PC, 12-13] Ground projects, he tells us, need not be selfish or self-centered. They may be altruistic, or require selfsacrifice on the part of the agent. [PC, 13] Or they may be more like an involvement with one particular other person. [PC, 16] The main idea of a ground project is that the agent identifies with some complex object of desire outside himself, with which he is thoroughly involved, and which gives his life meaning. [CU, 113] To have such projects is to have what Williams calls a character. Williams' notion of identification and thoroughgoing involvement with certain central ends and values is very similar to Frankfurt's notion of a decisive and wholehearted commitment to such ends and values. Both are intended to convey the idea of ends and values that are so deeply embedded in an agent's psychology that they effectively govern her entire existence, whether they are morally or rationally justified or not. So deeply embedded are they, the implication seems to be, that they render the problems of the infinite regress, self-evaluation, and moral paralysis either practically irrelevant or a symptom of pathology. 3.2.1.2. The Moral Point of View By contrast, Williams understands the notion of an impartial, moral point of view as connected with the Utilitarian's higher-order project of maximizing desirable outcomes [CU, 114], and describes it as sub specie aeternitatis. [CU, 118] Williams also characterizes the moral point of view as (1) different in kind from a self-interested point of view; (2) impartial; (3) indifferent "to any particular relations to particular persons." [PC, 2] Moreover, the moral thought that presumably issues from the moral point of view "requires abstraction from particular circumstances and particular characteristics of the parties, including the agent, except in so far as these can © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
