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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 353 arrangements that will, they claim, enable citizens to maximize the promotion of their individual final ends, whatever these may be. It thus in effect defends this vision as though it were itself a final end that the reader, independently of her actual particular final ends, ought to adopt. Like all moral and political philosophers engaged in substantive theory-building, Humeans deploy the analytical reasoning skills of their trade in order to demonstrate the rationality and intrinsic value of these alternatives, regardless of the particular final ends any individual may have. But since the Humean conception implies that transpersonal rationality has a merely instrumental role in satisfying the agent's desires, Kantians who accept it are disadvantaged in their attempt to demonstrate that transpersonally rational final ends provide a viable alternative to the pursuit of desire-satisfaction itself. The second question that then follows on the heels of the first is whether deliberation-events that identify new or alternative final ends it would be rational to try to achieve can also motivate action in the service of such ends, independent of desire-satisfaction. Certainly we can and do daydream about living differently, doing things differently, responding and interacting with one another differently than we have in the past. But can we actually be inspired to take concrete steps to realize such visions independent of the negative behavioral reinforcement against which we instinctively react? That is: can we carry out a resolve to take such steps, independent of the stick of painful past experience and the carrot of misplaced optimism? Again moral and political philosophers engaged in substantive theory-building presuppose that we can, even if this requires a sacrifice of comfort or desire-satisfaction on our parts. They assume we can be moved by the force of logic, by transpersonally rational considerations of justice, compassion, or perhaps even sheer disgust with our present level of moral turpitude, to override or subordinate self-interest - which often requires doing nothing and changing nothing - to what is best all things considered. Moral philosophers thus try actively to inspire their audience to adopt their visions of the good life, and to guide action accordingly. Like the most shameless writers of self-help manuals, they use argument, exhortation, and example to communicate their visions of the good with the same vividness and conviction it has for them.1 Thus by providing moral justifications of these visions that try rationally to persuade us of their value and importance to us, they aim to motivate our joint attempts to realize them. And sometimes, moral philosophers succeed in this endeavor, for good or for ill. Patanjali's Actually some of those self-help manuals can be pretty effective, provided that the author is both skilled and (very important) enthusiastic. Some recent volumes on time management are particularly worthy of the name "motivational literature." There are also some good ones on nutrition. Just because we cannot be rational dissuaded from a craving for a jelly doughnut does not imply that we cannot be rationally persuaded to desire broccoli sprouts. 1 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
