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Show Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 26 transpersonal rationality from a central functional and valuational role in the way the structure of the self is conceived signals a move away from the "slave morality" that valorizes the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality as essentially constitutive of human survival and flourishing. This displacement also signals a move toward alternative, übermenschlichen norms of egocentric behavior that implicitly condone freer and more blatant exercises of power in the service of desire, instinct and emotion. It is no accident that this Gestalt shift occurs at an historical juncture when such exercises and displays of power are increasingly necessary to defend conventional social arrangements - both inside and outside the academy - against rational Socratic interrogation by individuals and communities traditionally disempowered by them; and are valorized by unconstrained market forces that dismantle the democratic underpinnings of the social contract. But it is then doubly ironical that the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality themselves should be marshaled by some philosophers to justify them. The philosophical use of reason to justify unreason then obliges those philosophers who explicitly value reason, rational interrogation, and the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality more generally as intrinsic goods to defend them in turn. It requires us to reaffirm and protect these intrinsic goods as essential and definitive of philosophical practice, regardless of the express philosophical views on which they are honed. It requires us as well to realize these values in our philosophical practice, regardless of professional repercussions. And it requires us to disregard those repercussions as secondary to the preservation of rational integrity. That is, the philosophical task is to demonstrate the deeply entrenched necessity of transpersonal rationality to coherent thought and action, independently of the express metaethical views or valuation of rationality any particular philosopher might hold. That is my task in this project. 6. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics In ethics we distinguish between a normative and a metaethical theory. A normative moral theory tells us what we ought to do, and why. Thus it traditionally utilizes such prescriptive terms as "ought," "should, "good," "right," "valuable," or "desirable." I offer an analysis of such terms in Volume II. This is the practical part of a normative theory, also known as casuistry. Such a theory also contains a value-theoretic component that enlists certain states, conditions, or events that explain what is good, right, or desirable: friendship, for example; or love, or reason, or integrity. Value theories differ with respect to both content and structure; I say more about these distinctions in Chapter V of Volume I. By contrast, a metaethical theory seeks to unpack the metaphysical presuppositions of a normative theory: to what sorts of entities, if any, its © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
