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Show Chapter X. Rawls's Instrumentalism 414 constitutes an alternative rational procedure that is not dependent on the Instrumentalist strategy he in A Theory of Justice deploys; and that this procedure can provide the metaethical defense of the theory as objective moral truth that the Instrumentalist strategy does not.8 2. Traditional Social Contract Theory 2.1. The Normative Theory In A Theory of Justice, Rawls positions himself as a Social Contract Theorist in the tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Kant (some would add Hegel). This is a lengthy list comprised of widely divergent philosophical sensibilities. But almost all share certain fundamental normative beliefs in common constitutive of the doctrine of liberal democracy. Most generally, almost all believe we should have a society that maximizes individual freedom to pursue personal goals and interests, given the existence of other people. Almost all assume, additionally, that the existence of other people, all equally engaged in pursuing personal goals, requires constraints imposed by a governing body that regulate and coordinate orderly interactions among them (here Hegel would be the clearest exception). From these two assumptions almost all conclude that society ideally should be structured so as to protect individual rights, freedom and autonomy as fully as possible, i.e. so as to maximize political equality, consistently with these constraints (Hobbes' view would necessitate qualification of this claim). Political equality, then, for the Social Contract Theorist, means equal protection under laws designed to safeguard these freedoms. It means that no interference by the governing body in the rights of individual citizens to conduct their affairs as they choose that is not justified by the ideal of political equality itself is defensible in a court of law; and that any individual citizen can call upon the legal system to protect her against any such infringement. The ideal of liberal democracy is therefore characterized by an inprinciple refusal to specify the content of personal goals or values deemed acceptable or worthy of pursuit by individual citizens. Individuals are assumed to be able to decide these matters for themselves, and to have the right to do so. Attempts by the state to define, impose, or circumscribe the range of such goals, beyond the bare minimum required for social cooperation and stability, are taken to be unwarranted interference in the exercise of Rawls accords greater significance to wide reflective equilibrium along these lines in explicit response to Habermas' critique of his views. See Jürgen Habermas, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism," and Rawls's "Reply to Habermas," both in The Journal of Philosophy XCII, 3 (March 1995). Rawls's reply is reprinted in Political Liberalism and I use that pagination. See particularly PL 384-385. 8 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
