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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 531 tendency to claim more universal rights, and our decreasing tendency both to beg or feel grateful for the granting of those benefits to which we believe ourselves entitled, and to respond generously to those who do (MP 226). Historically, she reminds us, such claims by some group of the oppressed against some class of oppressors were exclusive in nature: of commoners by the aristocracy against the king in the Magna Carta; of women and slaves by white men against the king in the U.S. Bill of Rights. "Slaves, nonlandowners, the poor, women, criminals, children, nonhuman animals have all been outgroups in relation to those in-groups who have claimed their rights in famous proclamations and manifestos" (MP 226), and rights can be manipulated to shore up traditional privileges as well as to extend them to the disadvantaged (MP 228-9, 231). Because rights are inherently capable of conflict, different rights-claiming groups de-emphasize or circumscribe different rights in order to claim others as universal (MP 228, 230); and coherence within a list of universal rights is purchased at the cost of precision and sometimes even presence of specifiable content (MP 228). So on the one hand, rights are often seen as more inherently individual and basic than obligations, duties, or responsibilities (MP 237-8). But on the other, Baier argues, the preservation of particular individual rights under particular circumstances are merely the tip of the iceberg of morality that are "supported by the submerged floating mass of cooperatively discharged responsibilities and socially divided labor" (MP 241); and the rules of discussion that must be observed in order for a speaker to be heard demonstrate this (MP 241-2). The individuality of rights is a foundational social fact about language-producing creatures. But the individualism of rights reveals it to be a cooperative social enterprise and so not as foundational as first appears. 3. Baier's Case for Hume over Kant Baier observes that since Hume preceded Kant, we know what Kant thought about Hume, but not what Hume might have thought about Kant (MP 268). She proposes to remedy that asymmetry, by mounting a Humean critique of these defects of the Kantian Social Contract-Theoretic model. She thinks these defects, and many others, can be remedied by turning from Kant to Hume as a source of guidance for fashioning a contemporary, realistic, and fully responsive moral philosophy. As a beleaguered Kantian, I find odd her assumption that Kant provides the dominant model for contemporary moral philosophy, and have at least suggested the pervasiveness of the Humean model in preceding chapters. But of course an aggrieved sense of philosophical deprivation is not the exclusive preserve of either camp. Begin with Kantian Rationalism. Here Baier suggests we substitute Hume's concept of reflexion. She characterizes reflexion as a "response to a response ... a sentiment directed on sentiments" (MP 72, 81-3); and © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
