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Show Chapter XIII. Baier's Hume 538 our disdain, mockery and avoidance (MP 280) ... Is the Humean morality, which boasts of its nonmoralistic avoidance of 'useless austerities and rigours, suffering and self-denial' ... really so gentle if it condones derision, scorn, disdain, and avoidance of those who do not measure up to to its standards? ... The cost of a nonmoralistic Humean epicurean morality, its may seem, is even higher than that of Kantian moral law enforcement (MP 283). Baier has six answers to this question in defense of Hume. First, as we have already seen (MP 282), we could not universalize a maxim of social ostracism and ridicule, on pain of incoherence, so shaming practices must be occasional and limited in scope rather than the rule. Second, a Humean can criticize cruel laughter, disdain, and excessive scorn, and the personalities that give them voice (MP 284); and use these shaming practices themselves against their practitioners (MP 286). Third, we can attempt to improve ourselves, not through self-inflicted austerities or self-improvement programs, but rather through changing our circumstances or occupation (MP 284-5). Fourth, we can work to redesign educational and social customs in order to control hurtful derision and criticism of others (MP 284-5). Fifth, we can keep our disdain for others to ourselves, so as not to hurt their feelings (MP 287). And finally, we can, as we have seen, keep in mind to look "for the social fault behind the individual fault," and take "the responsibility for evil to be shared, never localizable in individual criminals;" we can promote "the articulation of shared standards of character assessment, and of application of them to particular persons only when the hurt involved in this application can reasonably be expected to do some compensatory good" (MP 288). In sum, we can limit the damage caused by shaming practices by engaging in them sensitively, infrequently, and wisely; and by reforming educational and social institutions and practices so as to minimize and control them. 4. An Assessment of Baier's Critique Others besides Baier have criticized the Kantian Contract-Theoretic model for being insensitive to the special and sometimes overriding 12 obligations we may have toward life partners, family, or close friends. But unlike Baier, most have misunderstood their target as metaethical rather than normative. The consequence has often been that they have shot themselves in the foot. They have concluded, self-defeatingly, that we should therefore do away with moral theory, as though they themselves were not doing moral 12 Notably Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," in Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge, 1981); Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," The Journal of Philosophy LXXIII, 14 (August 12, 1976), 453-466; Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," op.cit. Note 5. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
