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Show Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation 232 disinterested type of motivation, and rebuts the Humean attempt to reduce such an example to a rather less inspiring case of concealed egoism. It thus prepares the way for a more in-depth treatment of the whistleblower in Volume II, and a more satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon in transpersonally rational terms. 1. Self-Interest and Other-Direction The belief-desire model of motivation generates the problem that moral motivation in any meaningful sense does not seem to be possible within the designated constraints of this model. "Moral motivation" usually means nonegocentric motivation: motivation independent of self-interested or personally opportunistic considerations such as comfort, convenience, profit, or gratification. Non-egocentric motivation is by moral considerations alone - transpersonally rational appeals to intellect and conscience - that inspire us to act in others' interests even when this requires sacrificing or ignoring our own. Since the Humean conception stipulates desire as the sole conative impetus to action, it is on the face of it hard to see how or where such moral considerations might effectively function. It would seem that self-interested motivation is the only kind the belief-desire model recognizes. A motive is self-interested if it includes an interest the self takes in its own condition. Some Humeans, such as Bernard Williams and Annette Baier, argue that one can be motivated by desire without being motivated by selfinterest.1 Since desire can take a variety of objects, including other-directed ones, one can be motivated by altruistic desires such as benevolence or compassion that are not self-interested at all. Or so the reasoning goes (in Volume II, Chapter VI.4 I offer an analysis of compassion that disputes this.). But self-interest, in turn, can be dissected into short-term personal gain (i.e. immediate self-interest) and long-term personal gain (i.e. prudence). Satisfying a desire is one kind of personal gain, and the frustration of a desire is one kind of personal loss. To anticipate the satisfaction or frustration respectively of personal desire is one kind of anticipation of a short- or longterm personal gain or loss respectively, and we have already seen in Chapter II that without such anticipation we cannot be said to desire the object or state of affairs in question. Since such anticipation is, in turn, one kind of interest the self may take in its own condition, the satisfaction of personal desire is one kind of self-interested motive. So the Humean conception of the self in effect asserts that only self-interest can motivate us to act to promote others' interests. It therefore "solves" the problem of moral motivation by in effect denying that genuinely moral motivation is possible. Williams' and Baier's views are examined in greater depth below, in Chapters VIII and XIII respectively. 1 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
