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Show Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends 338 In order for desire-identification beliefs to facilitate rather than obstruct the pursuit of our desires, at least some of them must be logically consistent in content. In order for them to reidentify a desire as the same from one occasion to the next, distinguish among conflicting desires, and rank desires relative to one another in order of priority, at least some of these desire-identification beliefs must be general in the sense explained in Section 1.2, above. For if each of them contained either proper names or definite descriptions, we would lack that generic concept of a desire that enables us to identify each of them as being of a certain kind, comparable to or contrastable with others. But desire-identification beliefs that are both general and logically consistent apply impartially to all the states of affairs to which they refer, without regard to whose state of affairs they designate. Thus, for example, the proposition that a certain kind of agitation in the presence of a cigarette is a cigarette-craving applies impartially to my own as well as others' symptomatic agitations. In order for me to identify my desire for a cigarette when and if it occurs, I must believe this general proposition consistently. Similarly with the desire-identification belief that cigarette cravings are unhealthy. And similarly with the desire-identification belief that the desire to live an addiction-free life is worth pursuing. To be moved by desires about which we had no such transpersonally rational beliefs, or by desires about which the beliefs we had failed the transpersonal rationality criteria of generality, impartiality, and consistency, would be to behave blindly and reactively, without conceptual self-awareness. That we usually find such reactive behavior cause for concern or modification confirms the suspicion that the alternative to impartial rationality is not moral integrity but conceptual oblivion. A considered commitment to one's central desires and ground projects presupposes rather than pre-empts transpersonally rational principle. One might protest that this notion of rational principle appears to be much broader than the one Williams meant to target. For it is unlikely that Williams would want to deny the compatibility of moral integrity and abstract conceptual thought. Williams' criticism is presumably intended to address certain narrower, standard moral theories - specifically Kantian and Utilitarian ones - that he finds deficient in some respect. But the deficiency cannot lie in the universalistic or impartial character of these theories. For any theory or concept applies impartially to all subjects designated as within its scope, including Williams' own. However, the impartial application of Williams' own principles renders them self-defeating. This is because Williams' criticism implies either that we should either (a) act out of a commitment to our central desires and ground projects, not from the universalistic prescriptions of theory; or else that we should (b) avoid theorizing about our moral condition, alienated or otherwise. Since (b) would immediately obviate the point of advancing Williams' thesis © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
