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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 473 4 doing one's duty. Nevertheless, this second reading would be the one that seems to underlie Brandt's claim here, as he clearly means to contrast belief and desire as possible causes of action. But in this case Brandt cannot be supposed to be committed to a concept of desire defined solely as a disposition to action - not even an activated one, because even an activated disposition is merely one of many contributing causes of the actual action. If Brandt means to insist that desire rather than belief or duty is what causes action, then since a disposition to act is merely a contributing rather than a precipitating cause of action, desire itself cannot be merely a tendency or disposition to act. In that case desire itself must be an occurrent event, as the orthodox Humean model of motivation - and the representational analysis of desire I offered in Chapter II.2.1 - assume. Either Brandt must adhere to the orthodox version of the Humean model, which stipulates desire as an occurrent event that precipitates intentional action; or else he is a closet Kantian, for whom occurrent beliefs rather than desire play that role. The following section will adduce further evidence that the latter possibility most accurately describes Brandt's view. 4. Rational Desire An act, desire, or moral system for Brandt is rational if it survives criticism by relevant and available facts and logic (10, 113). It is objectively rational if it utilizes all available and relevant information; whereas it is subjectively rational if it utilizes all the beliefs rationally supported by evidence the agent has available at the time (72). An ideally rational agent is one whose desires and actions are what they would be if the agent had access to and was maximally influenced by all available relevant facts and logic (10, 11). This requires, first, that the agent is vividly and presently aware of every item of relevant information; and second, that the agent's desires have undergone cognitive psychotherapy. This Brandt defines as "value-free reflection" on available 4 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Zweiter Teil: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, Herausg. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1966), Ak. 399. It is regrettable that Gregor decided to change the translation of Beschaffenheit from "disposition" in her original translation of this work to "endowment" in the revised version. Neither is quite accurate, but the original rendering is closer to the literal meaning in this context, which would be something like "habit of character." Kant's subsequent elaboration of this concept as praedispositio makes clear that he means to be referring to character dispositions. Compare Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), with Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
