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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 345 dilemma holds for Annette Baier as well. It would seem that Slote's dilemma is of a sort any consistent Humean Anti-Rationalist will find difficult to avoid. 3.2.3. The Impersonal Point of View Next consider the possibility that an agent adheres to an impersonal point of view without adhering to universalistic moral principles. Recall that, on Williams' thesis, we can be detached from our ground projects in two ways: We may be detached from our own feelings and central aspirations, and we may be detached from others, in that moral theory obscures the reality of our circumstances, other people, and our attachments to them, by providing us with "one thought too many." In both cases, we lack personal reference or connection to our projects, by regarding them from a perspective from which they are not essentially ours. Now Williams would say that this just is the perspective of moral theory. But this is not necessarily so. To see this, consider the question of whether or not I should save my good friend Jeff first from some natural disaster; and suppose my moral theory sufficiently fine-tuned to yield the answer that I should, say, by the inclusion of a specialobligations-to-loved-ones clause. Williams' objection then would be that I am morally alienated from Jeff nevertheless, if I am motivated to save Jeff first because my moral theory prescribes it, rather than out of love for Jeff. Williams would say that my investment in this theory detaches me from my love for Jeff, since it is only in virtue of my theory that I am overridingly and unambivalently motivated to save him first. My impersonality is evinced by my primary attachment to my moral theory. To see how very odd this objection is, consider the alternative it seems instead to recommend: I save Jeff first, but not because he is my good friend, nor because I love him, nor because I value and respect him especially as a person - since these are all descriptions that can enter into impartial moral prescriptions. Indeed, let us suppose that none of these descriptions are true of Jeff. Instead I save him first simply because he is who he is, namely Jeff, and for no other reason. Clearly this is absurd. I have salvaged Jeff's uniqueness and specificity, and the uniqueness and specificity of my relationship to him, at the expense of its intelligibility. But the same objection could be made even if no such theory intervened between me and Jeff. For my desire to save Jeff first may also intervene between me and Jeff. In this case, the complaint would be that my investment in the satisfaction of my desires - especially, let us suppose, the altruistic and other-directed ones - takes precedence over my love for Jeff, since it is only in virtue of my unsatisfied desire to save him first that I am overridingly and unambivalently motivated to do so. This would be another example of the benevolent and other-directed but self-interested desires analyzed in Chapter VI.1.2. Here my impersonality, my lack of personal connectedness to Jeff, is evidenced not by my attachment to my moral theory, but rather by my © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
