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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception xxiii LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118; and "Michael Slote's Goods and Virtues," reviewed for The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII, 8 (August 1986), 468-73. Work on this chapter was supported by the Mellon Fellowship. Earlier versions of the discussions of Frankfurt and Watson were presented to the Philosophy and Anthropology Group and the Department of Philosophy, both at the University of Michigan; and the Departments of Philosophy at Stanford, U. C. Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Pennsylvania. I learned much from comments received on those occasions, and from detailed criticism and feedback by Michael Bratman, Jeffrey Evans and Allan Gibbard. I am equally grateful to Akeel Bilgrami, Jeffrey Evans and members of the Philosophy Department audiences at Wayne State University, Penn State, Georgetown, the University of California at San Diego, North Carolina State, Wesleyan, Memphis State, and the University of Minnesota for comments and criticism of my discussion of Williams. Section 1 of Chapter IX was delivered in a slightly different form to the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Convention in March 1995 in an Author Meets Critics session on Elizabeth Anderson's Value in Ethics and Economics; and later published under the title, "Making Sense of Value," in Ethics 106, 2 (April 1996), 525-537. An earlier version of Section 4 was delivered to the Moral Philosophy Colloquium at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Convention, Los Angeles, California in March 1986; and published under the title, "Instrumentalism, Objectivity, and Moral Justification," in American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 4 (October 1986), 373-381. Chapter X originated in September 1976 as a paper, "Continuing Persons and the Original Position," for John Rawls's graduate seminar in Moral Psychology, and I am grateful for his comments on it. A lecture by Joshua Cohen on Social Contract Theory in the Fall of 1978 at MIT had a salutary effect on Section IX.2. I have also benefited from criticisms of an earlier draft of this chapter by Peter Dalton. Parts were published under the title, "Personal Continuity and Instrumental Rationality in Rawls' Theory of Justice," in Social Theory and Practice 13, 1 (Spring 1987), 49-76. Work on this chapter was supported by a University of Michigan Rackham Faculty Fellowship and the Mellon Fellowship. The final draft was completed during my year at the Getty, as was the final draft of Chapter XI. Chapter XII, originally my term paper for John Rawls's Moral and Political Philosophy course at Harvard in the Spring of 1975, was also revised and completed during my wonderful and productive year at the Getty. I am grateful to Rawls, David Auerbach and Warner Wick for helpful criticisms of earlier drafts. An earlier version was published under the title, "Utility, Publicity and Manipulation," in Ethics 88, 3 (April 1978), 189-206. For criticisms of an earlier draft of Chapter XIII I would like to thank Anita Allen, Annette Baier, Margaret Carroll, John Deigh, Michael Stocker, and Judith Jarvis Thomson. A protodraft of Chapter XIV originally formed the © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
