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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 301 closer to the view I defend in Volume II than it is to some of the explicit pronouncements Nagel actually makes. His project constitutes a rejection, if not a refutation of practical solipsism, understood as the view that one is more real than others. Practical solipsism presupposes that a strictly and narrowly first-personal perspective on the world is the only available one, and that from that perspective only one's own existence - as Descartes' thinking being, perhaps - is ascertainable. From this perspective, universal judgments are at best bogus, assuming they have sense at all, since they can be applied only to oneself. By contrast, Nagel contends that in order to make sense of the ways we actually use language and conceive of ourselves as jointly inhabitants of a shared world, the conception of others as equally real must be assumed at the outset: The avoidance of solipsism requires that the conception of other persons like oneself (not necessarily the belief that there are any) be included in the idea of one's own experiences from the beginning. This is achieved by a conception which permits every feature of one's own situation and experience to be described and regarded, without loss of content, from the impersonal standpoint (106). To embrace solipsism is to forego the possibility that universal principles are meaningful, since they can apply only to oneself. It is also to forego the possible that some values are objective, since there are then no others to whom they can supply reasons to act. It is to imprison the interpretation of one's experience within the narrow conceptual constraints of concrete subjectivity; and to confine the governing principles of one's actions to particularistic recommendations as to what this person should do to achieve ends that have value only for her. Nagel rightly argues that we avoid this by adopting the impersonal standpoint on oneself. 3.3. Objectivity and Motivational Content Nagel contends that from the impersonal standpoint, only objective reasons, and not subjective ones, can motivate action (116-117). To see why, consider the difference between impersonal judgments about subjective reasons and impersonal judgments about objective reasons. Examples of impersonal judgments about subjective reasons would include the following: (1) Piper has reason to promote her interests. (2) Each person has reason to promote his or her own interests. 3.3.(1), according to Nagel, justifies for Piper her promotion of her own interests, but does not justify for anyone else their promotion of Piper's interests. Since I am merely someone from the impersonal standpoint, 3.3.(1) does not justify for me my promotion of Piper's interests, unless the personal premise, that I am Piper, is added. Similarly, 3.3.(2) justifies for each person © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
