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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 589 case of natural phenomena, for we are more successful in explaining the former than the latter: [T]he different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. ... There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in the actions, that flow from them; and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity (T 402-3). What are the certain principles of human behavior that Hume has in mind? These can be divided into two categories: (1) those principles describing the influence of sensory limitations and the violent passions on human behavior, which I shall refer to as principles of variability; and (2) those describing the modifying influence of the calm passions, which I shall call principles of stability.23 A violent passion is, as we saw, a "violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented" (T 437), whereas calm passions are "affections of the very same kind ... but such as operate more calmly. ..." (T 437) tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children, or the general appetite to good and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such (T 417). Whether a passion is calm or violent depends on the individual's temper, the circumstances and situation of the object, the intensity of other simultaneous passions, its degree of habituation, and the extent to which it excites the imagination (T 438). Hume's account of the relationship between (1) and (2) is basically as follows. Possible objects of desire undergo modification and distortion in perceived degrees of desirability, accordingly as the passions that adopt them vary in violence or intensity (or "vivacity"), and as other contingent conditions vary. The variability in the violence of the passions depends upon just the By contrast, Miller (ibid.) takes Hume's PIU principles to refer solely to general, higherorder rules by which our first-order beliefs and inferences can be corrected (see T 14650, and Book I, Part III, Section 15, "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects"). This is where my understanding of the PIU principles diverges from Miller's: Miller thinks Hume means to refer only to principles governing our judgments, whereas I contend that he means to refer to principles governing our behavior more generally. 23 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
