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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 509 them into question. In this sense, we may say that the pre-ideal Utilitarian society as a whole lacks self-consciousness - not a stringent condition to impose when a society is conceived as functioning smoothly. The roles and practices generated by rational Act-Utilitarian calculation are so embedded in the social structure that their justification is made unnecessary by the smooth and harmonious functioning of the social order itself. Now if each Utilitarian had no reason to suppose that others shared her convictions, she would obviously have the same good reasons to assume the utility of covert actions in this version of the ideal case as the actual one.18 Further, she might again correctly assume the greater utility of her esoteric morality than of its public counterpart. This hypothesis is grounded in the supposition that in this society a person's conduct would be fully informed by Instrumentalist Utilitarian reasoning, but would differ from actual behavior only in its degree of efficiency and success in bringing about the best consequences. For Sidgwick, the reasons militating against making public the Utilitarian credo have nothing to do with people's actual relative inefficiency or irrationality, but rather with the damaging consequences of publicly recognizing any rational individual as reasoning in the light of this doctrine; and the further difficulties that would ensue if everyone, or most people, were publicly acknowledged as reasoning similarly. In this respect and under these conditions, the principle of free riding and the principle of Utilitarianism are exactly analogous. Thus even if our hypothetically placed Utilitarian somehow found out that everyone else were also a Utilitarian, he might well judge even here that it would be better to maintain silence on this point for fear of the destabilizing effects of publicizing it. For note that to say that everyone is an Act-Utilitarian is not obviously to say that they act unanimously, but just to say that each tries19 to bring about the best overall consequences through his action. And if each has been following commonsense moral precepts in part on the supposition that they reflect the convictions of others and satisfy their valid expectations, we may well expect chaos to result when everyone's assumptions are thus publicly shown to be false. This would seem to hold whether everyone is a Utilitarian or not. So the viability of this variant of the ideal Utilitarian society would, like the non-ideal one, seem to require for its stability the very covert deception of others that Sidgwick wants the ideal society to preclude. An ideal Act-Utilitarian society that excludes the publicity This seems to be J.J.C. Smart's conclusion as well. See "An Outline of Utilitarian Ethics," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 50. 19 See Lyon's distinction between accepting and following the dictates of ActUtilitarianism (op. cit. Note 11, pp. 151-52). My reasons for adopting the former, weaker description will shortly become evident. 18 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
