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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 423 Finally, the parties are limited in the information available to them for making the choice by what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance (TJ 136-142). They do not know their personal identities, the society to which they previously belonged, their socioeconomic status in it, their conceptions of the good, or any other particular facts that might bias their choice of principles. For example, if one knew one's particular society, one might tend to choose principles of justice that would improve it specifically; if one knew one's socioeconomic status in it, one might tend to choose principles that would enhance or protect it; if one knew one's conception of the good, one might tend to choose principles that would favor the particular distribution of resources it required (TJ 137). By excluding all such information, no individual can use these actual resources, status or circumstances as leverage, threat, bribe or coercion to fashion principles to his own advantage. However, the parties do know the general facts about human nature, the laws of the natural and social sciences, and any other general facts that enable them to choose principles of justice. Together these constraints express the following assumptions. First, the choice of principles should not be biased by the personal advantage or disadvantage of the choosers. Second, it should not be possible to tailor principles of justice to one's own interests. And third, all choosers are equal in having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Under these circumstances, the requirements of rational deliberation can be observed and unanimity can be insured: [S]ince the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore, we can view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at random. If anyone after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached (TJ 139). Together with the circumstances of justice, the original position constitutes Rawls's version of the preconditioning circumstances that is traditionally invoked to metaethically justify the social contract. 3.2. Rawls's Normative Theory 3.2.1. The Two Principles of Justice Rawls then argues that, under these preconditioning circumstances, the parties would choose his two principles of justice to structure and regulate their society. The first of these is what Rawls calls the Millian Principle. This says that each citizen of a well-ordered society has a right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. All have equal liberties because all have equal rights under law designed to protect that liberty. The Millian Principle thus echoes and elaborates upon the © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
