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Show Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe's Thesis 190 consequentialist/ deontological distinction between normative theories is rather to be located in intensional metaethical attitudes proponents of these theories take toward them. But these attitudes suggest a different distinction which cuts across the consequentialist/ deontological one, namely between those normative theories which are person-regarding and those which are theory-regarding. Anscombe's thesis, then, finally implies a metaphilosophical claim about the moral psychology of philosophers rather than one about the adequacy of normative theories. Section 5 concludes by showing that all socalled consequentialist moral theories in fact depend for their models of motivation and rationality on the Humean conception of the self. 1. Values and Practice 1.1. Value Theory The first of the two ways in which the consequentialist/ deontological distinction can be used is value-theoretically. Here the distinction is formulated in such a way as to distinguish between two approaches to the construction of a moral theory (thus I speak of "value-theoretic uses," "value-theoretic senses," as well as "value theories" simpliciter, according to context). On this view, a consequentialist theory 4 is one that begins by defining the good, i.e. the state(s) of affairs that is (are) claimed to have intrinsic value, e.g. happiness, pleasure, or perfection. The right, or morally obligatory, is then characterized as that which is conducive to the good.5 The right may include, for example, I.e. that which Rawls and Frankena call a "teleological" theory, and which Brandt calls a "result" theory (see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 24; William Frankena, ibid., pp. 14-17; and Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 354. So-called "consequentialist" theories are actually only one possible kind of teleological theory, since, not all final ends of action are necessarily causal consequences of action. 5 Frankena distinguishes between the morally and the nonmorally good on the basis of the subjects this predicate applies to. On his view, only persons, groups of persons, and elements of personality (such as motives, intentions, emotions, and dispositions) may be morally good, whereas practically anything, including physical objects, experiences, and forms of government may be nonmorally good. The two bases for this distinction are (1) ordinary usage; and (2) the reasons for which we make the judgment of goodness, which are not further elucidated. My own linguistic intuitions disincline me to accept this distinction. But more important, I find no distinction in the range of reasons for which I might make such judgments that would lead me to accept it. Why should not happiness be viewed as a moral good, just as is virtue? Why cannot democracy be judged to be just as much a moral good as rational beings as ends in themselves? Now Frankena does argue that "it does not make sense to call [things like experiences or forms of government] morally good or bad, unless we mean that it is morally right or wrong to pursue them." (Ethics, ibid., p. 62). But neither would we think virtue or rationality were moral goods unless we thought it was morally right to pursue 4 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
