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Show Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation 246 gain in satisfaction we thereby obtain, even where we may neither value nor focus on that satisfaction. Satisfying our own desires, then, can be an object of interest for us - i.e. it can be an interest we take in the condition of our selves, even when it is not itself an object of pleasure, or even itself an object of desire - i.e. even when we do not envision the prospect of satisfying our desires as itself satisfying. For example, we might be disgusted or embarrassed by our desires, and envision their satisfaction with distaste or horror: we visualize ourselves at the moment of satisfaction, collapsing, weak-limbed, under the intense pleasure of long-deferred gratification; and realize that we are, in this state, not only abject and debased but also ridiculous. 3.2. Self-Direction vs. Self-Interest Classifying other-directed desire-satisfaction as an instance of personal gain and self-interest because of the anticipated personal satisfaction it entails does not in turn imply a view popular in some contemporary psychotherapy circles. According to this view, a "co-dependent" is a person, motivated by other-directed desires for another's well-being, to sacrifice his health, peace of mind, and/or financial security to care for that other, in order to obtain a sense of control, power, or self-esteem. This analysis treats ostensibly otherdirected behavior as not only self-interested but also ultimately self-directed, i.e. as fueled by a quest for personal control, power, or self-worth. It identifies the desire for another's well-being as instrumental to the satisfaction of an ultimate and motivating desire for personal control, etc. It thus reduces apparent altruism to actual egoism. I do not doubt that this analysis holds true for certain personalities under certain circumstances. But it would not be plausible to generalize this analysis into full-blown Psychological Egoism, i.e. into a thesis that all agents at all times, regardless of the ostensible content of their ends, are ultimately motivated by such desires for personal advantage, as Hobbes tried to do (on pain of contracting all the elementary theoretical objections to which Psychological Egoism is subject). By contrast, the thesis that all desire is a species of self-interested motivation can be so generalized, because it is entailed by a sharp distinction between desire and interest, plus a conceptual analysis of what a desire is. To summarize very briefly the analysis offered in Chapter II.2.1, a desire, regardless of content, is a motivationally effective psychological state whose object is envisioned as a source of personal satisfaction, such that the envisioned satisfaction of the desire is what moves one to achieve it. A Humean might be tempted to object that in addition to the satisfaction, surely the content of the object of desire itself, independently, also plays a role in moving us to achieve it. But it is only the fact that this content is part of the object of desire, and so conceived as wanting by the agent, that confers any special conative power on it. Aside from the agent's envisioning of the object © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
