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Show Chapter IV. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality: Formal Interpretations 134 minds. The faith that such a solution would make the problem of interpersonal comparisons go away is based on conceiving of the thirdpersonal, intersubjectively verifiable mechanism calibrating individual utility as though it were a thermometer measuring a temperature. However, if maximizing utility were relevantly similar to running a fever, then the problem of interpersonal comparisons would not arise. It is because it is not that a thermometer does not help to measure it. The utility mole example shows that the problem of interpersonal comparisons is caused, not by the existence of other minds, but rather by the existence of different subjects. It is not the inaccessibility of a subject's inner states, but rather his subjectivity 6 itself that presents the obstacle to interpersonal comparisons of utility. However, that interpersonal comparisons are in theory impossible to make does not imply that there is no objective fact of the matter about whether two individuals are equally satisfied or not. So interpersonal comparisons of utility are in theory impossible because it is impossible to compare utilities among subjects, whether or not those subjects' mental states are interpersonally accessible. If individual cardinal utility rankings cannot be interpersonally compared, interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made. Hence neither can meaningful interpersonal ascriptions of utility. There can be in theory no shared criterion of cardinal utility-maximization that would enable me to confirm the actual degree of utility-maximization you reveal in your behavior from the degree of utility-maximization I ascribe to your behavior. If there can be no shared interpersonal criterion of cardinal utility-maximization, then there can be no nonvacuous but universal criterion of cardinal utility-maximization that applies to the evaluation of each and every case, even under conditions of risk or uncertainty. So long as (U) is claimed to have universal application, such ascriptions will be vacuous whether "utility" is interpreted as a mental state or not. 1.4. Allais on Psychological Value Maurice Allais vehemently opposes this conclusion. He argues that cardinal utility, which he calls psychological value, "is fundamental to the theory of random choice [i.e. decisions under conditions of risk] (45)" and "an 7 undisputable [sic] reality(8)." He also believes an index of cardinal utility can 6 Thus I disagree with Allan Gibbard, who conceives the problem of making interpersonal comparisons as a special case of the problem of knowing other minds. See his "Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life," in Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 165-193. 7 "Fondements d'une Théorie Positive des Choix Comportant un Risque et Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de L'Ecole Americaine,"Memoir III of Econometrie XL (1953), 257© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
