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Show Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends 340 It appears, then, that in order for me to cultivate this disposition successfully, I must do so unintentionally. In order not to undermine it, my program of moral self-improvement must consist in acting blindly as I please, comforted by a self-serving Utilitarian argument that it is at least possible that my behavior may have the outcome I wish. Adherence to Williams' theory requires one deliberately to reject it. With a target of criticism as inclusive as that of universalistic rational principle, it is difficult to avoid shooting oneself in the foot. This conclusion suggests that to characterize the rational perspective as alienated because it prescribes general and impartially applied norms of behavior - which of course describe particular states of affairs under particular circumstances - is no more convincing than it would be to characterize one's general desires for love, friendship, and physical comfort as alienated because they do not as such exhaustively specify the particular states of affairs that contingently fulfill them. But Williams' thesis commits him to this. It seems that on his view, we are caught between moral alienation and conceptual oblivion. So it could not be, in fact, the universalistic formulation of the content of moral theory as such that is objectionable. For any principle that lacks a proper name or definite description applies universally, generally, and so impartially in the sense defined to all subjects designated as within its scope, including Williams' own. There is reason to doubt that universalistic principles as such engender moral alienation, and hence that they are necessarily interconnected with the impersonal point of view. 3.2.2.4. Slote on the Rationality of Pure Time Preference We have seen that Williams' attack on universalistic moral principles had particular relevance to Nagel's earlier defense of altruism. But Nagel also defended prudence, and prudence is governed by universalistic principles just as thoroughly. Fellow Humean Anti-Rationalist Michael Slote targets Nagel's universalistic defense of prudence in the same way that Williams targeted Nagel's case for altruism. But in his argument against the 27 irrationality of pure time preference, Slote confronts the same dilemma of self-defeat as did Williams. Slote formulates the view he means to target as that which claims that "different (properly articulated) times of life are of (roughly ) equal importance in determining the goodness of lives" (13), and identifies Thomas Nagel, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Charles Fried, and Henry Sidgwick as all proponents of this view. Against them, Slote wants to argue that "we typically and naturally think of some times of life as more important than others" (13). 27 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter I. Henceforth references to this work are paginated in the text. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
