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Show Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends 314 seeming self-evidence. Indeed, they may be so deeply ingrained that we unselfconsciously view them as part of the world rather than as part of our value system. Against them, alternative philosophical theories of the good do not stand a chance. The Humean conception of the self implies that normative moral philosophers who devote their energy to elaborating such alternative final ends are best understood as salaried daydreamers. Those who find much to criticize in the desires we now happen to have - or aver, at least, the inprinciple importance of rational criticism or justification of those desires - will find this state of affairs less than satisfying. 2. The Infinite Regress: Frankfurt's Humeanism 2.1. Self-Evaluation The problem of rational final ends is not just about how moral philosophers may be most gainfully employed. It has practical ramifications for the capacity for self-evaluation, as both proponents and opponents of that 6 conception have recognized. The difficulty comes from the assumptions that the self is structured by first- and second-order desires, and that second-order desires provide criteria for evaluation of the motivationally effective desires of the self. The question immediately arises of why we should accept as authoritative criteria these second-order desires. Why should we not subject them, in turn, to the critical scrutiny of third-order desires, and so on, ad infinitum? Frankfurt's answer is that "it is possible ... to terminate such a series of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily," by identifying oneself decisively with one of one's first-order desires. This means that questions regarding higherorder desires are not to arise: The decisiveness of the commitment [one] has made means that [one] has decided that no further question about [one's] second-order volition, at 7 any higher order, remains to be asked. But surely whether any questions remain to be asked about something is not a matter one can simply decide. If the state of affairs is unresolved, or suspect, or insufficiently analyzed, then it will raise questions to the discerning observer, regardless of what one has decided; and no amount of mere "decisiveness" will make them go away. If there are no rationally persuasive grounds for halting the ascent to higher-order desires, then the decisive commitment one has made would seem to be arbitrary after all. That I lack the stamina or interest necessary for performing acts of higher-order self-evaluation does not confer authority by fiat on the n+1-order desires beyond which I refuse to 6 Op. cit. Note 1. Also See Gary Watson, "Free Agency," The Journal of Philosophy LXXII, 8 (April 1975), 205-220. 7 Frankfurt, ibid. Note 1, 16. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
