| OCR Text |
Show Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe's Thesis 222 chapter are correct, those intensional attitudes toward the components of moral action are simply confused. However, Anscombeans may then cite the very clear differences in ethical sensibility that often motivate adherence to consequentialism or deontologism.35 Self-styled deontologists often regard their own imperfect attempts to do what they believe to be right as challenge enough, without incorporating any vision of what would be good for other people into their moral program. They may believe that their primary task is to attend to their own moral behavior, while relying on the essential humanity and rationality of other people as sufficient evidence that they will do the same. This conviction may be explained by the assumption that these two characteristics, of rationality and humanity, are sufficient conditions for inclusion in a general moral community whose continued existence is dependent on the capacity for moral autonomy, i.e. for generating and regulating one's actions in accordance with universal moral laws. Those who exercise this capacity for immoral purposes are then viewed as fully responsible agents to be condemned or punished, but never remade or reprogrammed in ways that would be thought to violate their essential personhood. Deontologists may thus regard as both arrogant and manipulative the consequentialist's eagerness to assume responsibility, not only for his own behavior, but for events and states of affairs that may be only remotely causally contingent on it; and to take on the project of the moral reform of others on a grand scale as part of one's personal moral program. Self-styled consequentialists, on the other hand, often believe that a healthy sense of sympathy and compassion for other people profoundly demands a commitment to their welfare that may even outstrip one's commitment to one's own. This sentiment may be justified by a broader conception of the moral community that includes all sentient beings, or perhaps all beings with complex central nervous systems. Thus they may be less inclined to differentiate between moral agents based on degree of competence or rationality. They may therefore find unthinkable a morality that requires them to ignore the fact that all moral agents and their behavior are mutually interdependent within a common sociopolitical and causal network, just as all beings and events are within the larger common physical network. They may view as selfish and irresponsible the deontologist's preoccupation with her own moral probity, and willingness to sacrifice the well-being of other people on the altar of moral law. These are serious attitudinal differences indeed. But they bear no relation to the substance of anyone's ethical views. We have already seen that disagreements over actual normative priorities do not force the commitment Stephen White's insights and critical comments have helped this and the following paragraph. 35 © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
