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Show Chapter X. Rawls's Instrumentalism 446 this may not be the case (TJ 176). Moreover, the beneficiaries of unjust institutions also know that their inability to maintain their favored positions is a direct consequence of having chosen principles of justice which, when implemented, so alter the circumstances of their life that their original plans of life, i.e. continuing to benefit from these institutions, become untenable. But we have also seen that if the parties know, in the original position, that implementation of the principles of justice may thus require them to sacrifice rather than advance their conceptions of the good in this way, they cannot fail to see the instrumental irrationality of choosing the two principles of justice in the first place. It may seem that the parties do not have reason to regret their choice if they recognize that the two principles of justice were the best available alternative open to them.22 And perhaps it is true that no alternative principles of justice would have the effect of securing their future happiness and security. But it was open to them not to choose principles of justice at all, i.e. to opt for some version of the "No Agreement Point" (TJ 147). Unless we assume that the parties were forced into the original position - surely an unpalatable assumption in view of the parties' freedom and autonomy (TJ 11, 13), and Rawls's allegiance to traditional Social Contract Theory, it is open to the parties to regret choosing to live by principles of justice in the first place, rather than to maintain the status quo in their previous society. Rawls does not consider the latter as a viable alternative for the parties in the original position, but there is no clear reason why he should not. For unlike traditional Social Contract Theory, the parties do not, on the continuity thesis, enter into the original position from a state of nature mutually acknowledged as unacceptable. So it is consistent with the constraints on information expressed by the veil of ignorance (TJ 12, 136-7), i.e. that the parties know nothing of the circumstances of their own society, that the parties nevertheless elect to take their chances in their society as it has been up to now, rather than risk having to abdicate everything that gives meaning and satisfaction to their lives - even if this requires the deliberate perpetuation of social injustice. For there is, in addition, nothing in the description of the parties' motivation, circumstances, or interests in A Theory of Justice that commits them to choosing just principles for society. Recall that their stipulated sense of justice required only that they be able to recognize and honor principles of justice once chosen, not that they deliberately set out to choose justice in the first place. By hypothesis, the parties are moved by the desire to further their conceptions of their own interests, or good, whatever this may turn out to be (TJ 129). And the fact that it is the circumstances of justice that move them to deliberate (TJ 128) does not imply that they must opt for just principles to 22 I was helped by discussion of this point with John Rawls. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
