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Show Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider 504 They diverge, however, in the motivational content they ascribe to individual agents' desires and in the particular intentional content of their respective conceptions of utility. For Hobbes the self-interested motivation is self-directed, whereas for Sidgwick it is other-directed. For Hobbes the social good for each agent is the promotion of the satisfaction of that agent's selfdirected desires, whereas for Sidgwick the social good for each agent is the promotion of the satisfaction of everyone's self-directed desires (for pleasure, according to Sidgwick). Hobbes and Sidgwick are also similar, up to a point, in their attitudes toward social instability. In the actual society, social instability for Hobbes would seem to threaten whenever (1') all citizens are motivated to satisfy self-directed desires, and (2') all secretly break social rules. For in this case, the rules lose their currency and the practices based on them disintegrate. In Sidgwick's actual, non-Utilitarian society, social instability threatens somewhat less whenever (1") all Act-Utilitarian citizens are motivated to satisfy their otherdirected desires, and (2") each secretly breaks social rules when maximizing social utility justifies it. For in this case, the rules lose their currency only for Act-Utilitarians, and the practices based on them are overtly maintained. Hobbes and Sidgwick thus diverge in their treatment of the publicity condition. Hobbes argues that social instability in the actual society can be minimized if any such free rider is publicly caught in the act, for this tends to call forth a communal, punitive response that discourages free riding. Sidgwick argues that social instability in the actual society is exacerbated if any such Act-Utilitarian is publicly caught in the act, for this undermines not only the Act-Utilitarians' but more generally the community's adherence to commonsense moral rules. So whereas publicity restores a disrupted social order for Hobbes, it undermines social order for Sidgwick. Each philosopher's argument has equal application to the other's view. It is as true for Sidgwick's non-ideal society as for Hobbes' commonwealth that sanctioning rule-violators may have a deterrent effect on others; and it is as true for Hobbes' commonwealth as for Sidgwick's non-ideal society that publicizing rule-violations recognizes and disseminates an unsavory alternative to adherence that may encourage the very behavior it is intended to deter. One of the problems with Instrumentalist reasoning is that it enables us to advance as a legitimate justification for action any conjectured causal © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
