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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 583 any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite" (T 437). Thus the passion, strictly speaking, is merely the set of physiological and psychological sensations caused by some object or circumstance. In itself, this set does not represent anything; it is an "original modification of existence." In discussing the indirect passions of pride and humility, Hume also distinguishes between the cause of the passions and their objects: … betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. ... The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause, or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited turns our view to another idea (T 278). In the context of this discussion, Hume means to distinguish as the cause of the passion that intentional object we feel pride or humility about: Every valuable quality of mind ... wit, good sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride. ... A man may [also] be proud of his beauty, strength, agility. ... But this is not all. ... Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, ... any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility (T 279). The object of the passion, on the other hand, is in each case the self, i.e. that object in relation to which the ideas of "valuable qualit[ies] of the mind, ... the body likewise, ... [and] whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us" (T 279) can excite such sentiments in us.20 Thus the cause of a passion for Hume is that which we might be inclined to describe as its intentional object, while the object of the passion for Hume is equivalent to what we might describe as its cause, i.e. self-aggrandizement. However, in discussing the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, and volition (T 438), Hume often equates the object of a desire, i.e. that to which the passion is directed, with what he calls its cause, for example, when he claims that contrary passions arise from different objects of desire or aversion respectively (T 441, 443). Here he allows the possibility that that which causes a passion, e.g. a freshly-baked apple pie, can be the object of the passion as well. Nevertheless, in spite of Hume's care in distinguishing the cause and intentional object of a passion from the passion itself, it is not plausible to argue that passions cannot be irrational on the ground that in themselves they do not represent or judge anything. For this distinction between the passion and its intentional object is suspect. It is not easy to imagine how we might 20 Also see Annette Baier, "Hume's Analysis of Pride," The Journal of Philosophy LXXV, 1 (January 1978), 27-40. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
