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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception xxi Steinvorth, and Sigrun Svavarsdottir; and fifteen years' worth of brilliant and feisty undergraduates at Wellesley College. Chapter I of both volumes, "General Introduction to the Project: The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics," was drafted during an unpaid leave of absence from Wellesley College during early 1998 and funded by an NEH College Teachers' Research Fellowship. The NEH support came at a crucial moment and I am deeply grateful for it. This chapter incorporates and modifies some passages and sections of my "Two Conceptions of the Self," published in Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September l985), 173-197 and reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual VIII (1985), 222-246. The discussion of AngloAmerican philosophical practice that appears in Sections I.2 and I.3 benefited from comments by Anita Allen, Houston Baker, Paul Boghossian, Ann Congleton, Joyce Carol Oates, Ruth Anna Putnam and Kenneth Winkler, as well as by members of the audience to the 1994 Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium symposium, "Philosophy as Performance" at which these remarks were originally presented. The chapter received its near-final form during my tenure as a Research Scholar at the Getty Research Institute during the academic years 1998-1999. For providing me with all of the conditions I requested - some very idiosyncratic - as necessary for me to make substantial progress on this and many other parts of this project, my gratitude to the Institute knows no bounds. My debt of thanks to Brian Davis, Larry Hertzberg, Karen Joseph, Michael Roth, and Sabine Schlosser is particularly great. While there I also benefited a great deal from discussion of these and related topics with Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus. I would also like to thank Naomi Zack for her interest and willingness to publish an earlier version of this chapter, despite its length, in her edited collection, Women of Color and Philosophy (New York: Blackwell, 2000). Chapter II, "The Belief-Desire Model of Motivation," was first drafted in 1981, while I was an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan. I learned much from discussing the issues with Richard Brandt, William Frankena, Allan Gibbard, Jaegwon Kim, David Velleman, Nicholas White, and Stephen White, however much we in the end agreed to disagree. The chapter was redrafted in 1985, after having spent two wonderful and productive years at the Stanford University Philosophy Department on an Andrew Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellowship from 1982 to 1984. While there I benefited from discussing action theory with Michael Bratman and philosophy of science with John Duprés. Not until my year at the Getty Research Institute in 1998 was I able to return to this part of the project. The enthusiasm and dedication of the Getty staff in putting at my disposal all of the research and administrative assistance I needed, and more, to update and revise it in light of more recent discussions helped me to believe in the importance of doing so. Work on Chapters III and IV was partially supported by the Mellon PostDoctoral Fellowship, a Georgetown University Faculty Research Grant in © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
