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Show Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider 520 attachments and dependencies on them, insofar as these involve shared commitment and trust; and he will be unable to seek or find confirmation of criticism of them in the convictions of others. It is questionable how worthwhile a Utilitarian might then find his doctrine. For not only would it seem to necessitate a degree of alienation from others, the psychological cost of which cannot be repaid. It also requires a rather strong, and probably incorrect, assumption about human psychology if the agent's hierarchy of values is to be stable. It needs, that is, to assume that a person's convictions can thrive on purely internal support, that a lack of confirmation and esteem of these beliefs by others will not erode or weaken their importance and value in the Utilitarian's own mind. This is not to claim that our deepest convictions require public consensus in order to reassure us of their validity; it is just to question the sense in which moral principles can be believed to be correct if they are in principle acknowledgeable only to oneself. This has certain consequences, implicit in the discussion above, for how the consistent Utilitarian must regard other people. She must, without confiding in them, both do what she sees as best promoting general utility, and also do what is necessary to get others to do the same. The telling asymmetry of justification we mentioned near the beginning of this discussion thus reappears in a stronger form: the Utilitarian acts from well-reasoned motives that accord with her deepest convictions, while she requires and expects no such deliberation on the part of others. It is sufficient for her purposes that they perform the (from her perspective) requisite actions and have the requisite thoughts and responses. But however complex or reflective these may be, they will have no independent validity for the Utilitarian. She accords them importance only insofar as they coincide with her plan. That is, she views the opinions, feelings, and deliberations of other people - indeed, other people themselves - as instrumental to her goals. Now in our dealings with young children, we often get them to do or think things that are instrumental to worthwhile goals we have for them, by arranging their environments in certain ways; by dissembling, simplifying, or ambiguating the facts in answer to their queries; by carefully selecting the states of affairs, behavior, and utterances to which they shall be privy. We rightly justify these practices by pointing out a child's malleability and the necessity of paying close attention to formative influences during the years of growth. This filtering of influences is necessary, we point out, if children are ever to reach a sufficient degree of maturity and inner stability to understand and cope with the complexities and perils of the world from which we now seek to shield them. Thus a child's eventual competence, maturity, and autonomy adequately justify our covert practice of manipulating his environment. Such a practice is rightly held to be ultimately in the child's best interests. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
