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Show Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception 503 (2) each publicly breaks social rules when maximizing social utility warrants it. 2. Sidgwick and Mill on Secrecy Under actual circumstances, however, Sidgwick views the case somewhat differently: The Utilitarian may have no doubt that in a community consisting generally of enlightened Utilitarians, these grounds for exceptional ethical treatment would be regarded as valid; still he may ... doubt whether the more refined and complicated rule which recognizes such exceptions is adapted for the community in which he is actually living; and whether the attempt to introduce it is not likely to do more harm by weakening current morality than good by improving its quality.12 While the justification for conforming or failing to conform to accepted moral rules is the same for the Utilitarian in the actual as in the ideal community, there is an asymmetry with respect to the accessibility of his principles to others. In the actual, implicitly non-Utilitarian community, the Utilitarian must consider not only the effects of following or not following commonly accepted moral precepts, but also the comparative utility of letting others know the grounds for his decision. For the Utilitarian does not, presumably, do the same things, for the same reasons, as others do in this situation. So whenever his considered actions diverge from those enjoined by the moral rules of the community, the Utilitarian must weigh the utility of this divergence as such, in addition to the utility of the act itself. As Sidgwick argues, the destabilizing effects of this divergence on others may well lead the Utilitarian to conclude that the greatest utility would be served either by performing his action secretly, or by performing it publicly and lying about his reasons for doing so. For in the latter case as well, publicizing the Utilitarian doctrine might undermine general conformity to useful moral precepts even more effectively than his seemingly immoral act, which is at least susceptible to moral or legal sanction. In the non-ideal case, then, Sidgwick's Utilitarian would seem on the face of it to become a Hobbesian clandestine free rider. So Hobbes' and Sidgwick's views share the following structural similarities. Both rely on the Humean model of rationality. Both rely on the Humean model of motivation. Both deploy the Humean conception of the self in the service of morally justifying comparable conceptions of the social good. And both depend on the same basic Instrumentalist reasoning that justifies clandestine disobedience of social rules: if promoting utility justifies following the rules, then promoting utility equally justifies breaking them. 12 Sidgwick, op. cit., Note 1, p. 489. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
