| OCR Text |
Show Chapter X. Rawls's Instrumentalism 442 Now let us consider whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls; and what problems for his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. To begin with, there is much in A Theory of Justice to lend support to the continuity thesis. Certain passages on what Rawls calls the strains of commitment suggest that the parties in the original position are psychologically continuous with identifiable members of the well-ordered society ((1) and (2) of the continuity thesis). For example, when Rawls stipulates that the parties have a sense of justice in that they "can rely on each other to understand and act in accordance with whatever principles are finally agreed to. Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend on one another to conform to them" (TJ 145), the importance of insuring that these individuals are, in the well-ordered society, capable of adhering to the commitment they made in the original position is evident. This is reemphasized later when Rawls asserts that In view of the serious nature of the possible consequences [of the original agreement], the question of the burden of commitment is especially acute. A person is choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern his life prospects ... the parties must weight with care whether they will be able to stick by their commitment in all circumstances (TJ 176). These claims clearly presuppose that the parties in the original position are, and know themselves to be, psychologically continuous with particular members of the society the basic structure upon which they now decide. Also, in discussing sound procedures of moral education in the well-ordered society, Rawls proposes that "in agreeing to principles of right the parties in the original position at the same time consent to the arrangements necessary to make these principles effective in their conduct" (TJ 515). This condition is clearly meant to insure the conformity to principle in the well-ordered society of the parties in the original position. Finally, Rawls made clear in subsequent discussion 20 that the parties in the original position are to be conceived as future members of a well-ordered society. Also relevant to the continuity thesis are those passages in A Theory of Justice which suggest that the parties in the OP are continuing persons in that they are partially determined in their tastes and values by events prior to the original position ((2) and (3) of the continuity thesis), and that this must be considered in the subsequent well-ordered society. Rawls claims, for example, that the parties in the original position are to decide in advance the principles Practice 13, 1 (Spring 1987), 49-76, from which this chapter originates. Also see Section 8, below. 20 "Reply to Alexander and Musgrave," Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 (November 1974), 633-39. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
