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Show Chapter XIV. Hume's Metaethics 572 That reason can function only as a means to achieve objects we desire, either by alerting us to the existence of such objects, or by charting the causal path to their attainment, implies not only Hume's acceptance of the positive utilitymaximization thesis, but indeed the negative one as well. For that reason can only be a means to our ends clearly implies that it does not function to circumscribe those ends themselves. Both of these theses are buttressed further by Hume's claims in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. His adherence to the positive thesis is supported by his claims that nothing but [reason] can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and their possessor (E 234/285). and that it directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery (E 246/294). As in the Treatise, Hume is quite explicit on the point that, just as reason discovers causal means for the realization of particular ends, similarly reason itself is the means by which we discover those causal relationships most suitable to their attainment. Hume is most explicit in his affirmation of the negative utilitymaximization thesis in the Enquiry. There he maintains quite clearly that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties (E 244/293; italics in text). Similarly, he argues that we require the sentiment of humanity, i.e., a feeling for the happiness of mankind and a resentment of their misery, in order to be motivated to promote these ends; for were the end totally indifferent to us, we should face the same indifference to the means ... reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favor of those which are useful and beneficial (E 235/286; italics in text). In both passages the point is the same: It is not reason, but rather our passions and sentiments, which determine the ends that reason helps us achieve. Thus Hume's view satisfies the two essential conditions of the utilitymaximization model of rationality. 2. Hume's Model of Motivation The view I have attributed to Hume can be understood in two ways, and the discussion so far has emphasized only one of them. I have been concerned © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin |
